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2The Community Choice Between
High and Low Technology Approaches to
Resource Recovery
ABSTRACT
Traditional methods for disposing of municipal solid
waste, landfilling and incineration, have in many communities
been unable to meet local disposal needs and various environ-
mental regulations. In recent years, resource recovery --
the recovery of materials and/or energy from household waste
-- has offered an alternative. There are two generic
approaches to resource recovery: the "low technology" approach
involves household separation of recyclable materials and
the "high technology" approach involves processing mixed
wastes to recover energy and perhaps materials.
The debate over the merits of each approach has focused
on national issues of resource conservation, consumption
habits, and disposal impacts. However, the decision to im-
plement or participate in a resource recovery program is
usually municipal. The thesis thus examines the appropriate
technology issue from a community perspective. Using a case
study approach, it observes how communities view the low-
versus-high technology issue, and defines some elements of
a choice process for communities considering resource
recovery.
The case studies suggest that municipalities typically
do not face a binary choice between low and high technology
approaches. Rather, they can select combinations of resource
recovery options or sequence their choices so as to best
address local needs. A community's particular objectives
and circumstances with respect to solid waste management
will have a major influence on its evaluation of resource
recovery options.
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61. INTRODUCTION
The United States generates large quantities of muni-
cipal solid waste (MSW) -- about 140 million tons annually.
Traditional disposal methods -- sanitary landfilling and
incineration -- have been hard pressed to keep pace, what
with rising disposal costs and environmental and health
regulations of disposal practices. Cost and capacity
problems with traditional disposal have led many communities
to consider alternatives; one attractive option is resource
recovery -- the recovery of materials or energy (or both)
from the waste stream.
There are two generic -- and fundamentally different --
approaches to resource recovery. The so-called "low tech-
nology" approach is labor-intensive, and involves separating
household solid wastes into recyclable and non-recyclable
components.* Recyclable wastes are then collected and
transported separately to material markets. The so-called
"high technology" approach is capital intensive; mixed MSW
is processed at a centralized facility, and energy is
usually recovered from the combustible portion. The choice
between high and low technology approaches to resource
recovery is the basis of the appropriate technology issue.
* Or, rather, not mixing wastes at their point of
generation.
7Arguments for one or the other revolve primarily around
national issues of disposal impacts and natural resource
policy. These include: the net energy requirements of
each approach, their implications for MSW disposal needs
and impacts, their effect on rates of natural resource ex-
ploitation, and their effect of patterns of consumption
and waste generation.
The appropriate technology issue has been addressed
in previous studies and papers, but in each case from
either a national or non-site-specific perspective. There
apparently have been no studies of this issue from a local
or community perspective. Such an approach would be useful,
since the decision to implement or participate in a resource
recovery program is usually made by local government. At
this level, most of the issues central to the national
debate are external to the resource recovery choice (for
example, a community should not expect its choice to in-
fluence the size of secondary material markets or consumption
habits). Also, a community may find that key variables, such
as MSW composition or current disposal costs, differ signi-
ficantly from the national averages, on which most analyses
of appropriate technology are based.
For these reasons, an analysis of the low-versus-high
technology resource recovery issue from a community per-
spective would be helpful. The analysis is based on a case
study approach, considering four cases in which communities
8selected and successfully implemented resource recovery
systems. In each case, the choice process is examined --
circumstances leading to a decision, options considered,
participants, choice criteria used, project implementation,
and results of the project to date.
From the case studies, the thesis (i) observes how
communities view the low-versus-high technology resource
recovery issue and (ii) defines some elements of a choice
process for communities considering resource recovery, in
light of the appropriate technology issue. The four cases
are not intended to describe all possible resource recovery
options or all project selection and implementation issues.
They illustrate four very different choice processes and
provide mostly site-specific results. Nonetheless, they
allow me to make some general comment-s about the appropriate
technology issue and a process for community. choice. Figure
1 locates the four cases.
Several conclusions are worth highlighting. First, the
low-versus-high technology choice is not binary. The two
approaches to resource recovery are not really substitutes,
and communities tend not to view them as competing options.
Second, a community's particular objectives and circumstancees
with regard to solid waste management will have a major in-
fluence on its evaluation of resource recovery options. Third,
the resource recovery choice is very closely tied to imple-
mentation issues. Given the high degree of interdependence
9Figure 1 Case Study Locations
Marblehead
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of various elements of a resource recovery strategy, a com-
munity must usually address specific implementation issues
(such as materials and/or-e:nergy buyers) prior to selecting
a particul-ar option.
The following two sections provide background infor-
mation on solid waste management practices and resource re-
covery options, and describe the low-versus-high technology
debate in more detail. Sections IV - VII contain the four
case studies; the first two are examples of the low-technology
approach, and the second two illustrate the high-technology
approach. Section VIII discusses the resulting conclusions,
re-examining the appropriate technology question and defining
a process for communities wishing to compare the two approaches
in their context.
10
Notes
1. See, for example: Marchant Wentworth, Resource Recovery:
Truth & Consequences (Washington, D.C.: Environmental
Action Foundation), 1977; Congress of the United States,
Office of Technology Assessment, Materials and Energy
from Municipal Waste, Volume I (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. GPO), July 1979; and California Resource Recovery
Association, Recycling: The State of the Art (Santa
Barbara: Comm. Envir. Council), 1978.
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II. WHY RESOURCE RECOVERY?
The purpose of th-is section is to provide some back-
ground for the subsequent case studies and discussion. It
therefore reviews solid waste disposal practices in the U.S.,
their associated problems, and various resource recovery
systems. Readers familiar with these issued may wish to
skip this section.
Solid waste can be conveniently divided into two cate-
gories: municipal and non-municipal. Municipal solid
waste (MSW), which we concentrate upon, includes wastes gene-
rated by households, sma l commercial and business estab-
lishments, and institutions such as schools and government
offices. It specifically excludes solid waste produced by
industrial, farming, mining, and demolition activities. MSW
is composed of a remarkable variety of products and materials;
Table 1 indicates its composition in general terms.
U.S. households and commercial sources currently
generate a considerable amount of MSW -- over 140 million
2
tons annually, or nearly 3.5 pounds per capita per day.
Waste generation has grown steadily in the last two decades,
and is expected to continue to increase somewhat in the
future. EPA predicts 225 million tons annually by the year
3
1990. Table 1 also provides data on MSW generation in 1975.
12
TABLE 1 MATERIAL COMPOSITION OF MSW*
Waste content
as discarded
Net waste
disposed of
after recycling
Material Million
tons
% of
total
Million
tons
% of
total
Paper 44.1 32.4 37.2 29.0
Glass 13.7 10.1 13.3 10.4
Ferrous 11.3 8.3 10.8 8.4
Aluminum 1.0 0.7 0.9 0.7
Other nonferrous 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3
Plastics 4.4 3.2 4.4 3.4
Rubber 2.8 2.1 2.6 2.0
Leather 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.5
Textiles 2.1 1.5 2.1 1.6
Wood 4.8 3.5 4.8 3.7
Other 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Total nonfood
product waste 85.4 62.7 77.5 60.4
Food waste 22.8 16.8 22.8 17.8
Yard waste 26.0 19.1 26.0 20.3
Miscellaneous
inorganic wastes 1.9 1.4 1.9 1.5
TOTAL 136.1 100.0 128.2 100.0
Source: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Fourth Report
to Congress: Resource Recovery and Waste Reduction, SW-600
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO), 1977, p. 1 8 .
* 1975 data for the United States. The composition reflects
considerable geographic and seasonal variation.
MSW disposal practices have improved significantly since
the 1960s, when open dumping and incinerators were prevalent.
The 1972 Clean Air Act resulted in the closure of most large
MSW incinerators, and most open dumps were either closed or
converted to sanitary landfills in response to state laws and
the 1976 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. Sanitary
landfilling is an engineered method of MSW
13
burial -- waste is spread in layers, compacted, and covered
4
with a layer of soil.
While vastly superior to open dumps, sanitary landfills
nonetheless pose a variety of environmental and economic
problems. Landfills can cause surface and groundwater con-
tamination, due to surface runoff and underground leachate
movement. In recent years, groundwater contamination has
emerged as a serious environmental and public health issue
-- currently, about half of the U.S. population is served
by groundwater. Landfills consume considerable amounts of
land each year, effectively pre-empting other uses well into
the future.
Landfilling, once a cheap d-isposal method, is fast
becoming a very costly one. EPA estimated the average cost
of MSW collection and disposal in 1976 to be about $30/ton,
5
-- or $4 billion per year nation-wide. About 20% of this
amount, or $6/ton, represents disposal costs. As state
and federal regulations reduce the environmental and health
impacts of landfilling, the "full" economic cost of landfilling
will be more apparent. In addition to inflation and growth
of the waste stream itself, disposal costs are expected to
increase in the future due to rising land values and longer
6
haul distance to new outlying disposal sites. Opposition
by landowners and nearby residents to landfill siting rep-
resents a serious obstacle to the long-term viability of
landfilling in many areas.
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There are three generic approaches to the problems of
excessive MSW generation and conventional disposal: waste
reduction, source separation (with materials recycling), and
centralized processing (with energy recovery). Waste re-
duction refers to the prevention of waste at its source by
redesigning products or changing patterns of production and
comsumption. It can be achieved in several ways: by
developing products that require less material per unit
(eg. smaller automobiles), by developing products with longer
average lifetimes, by substituting reusable products for
"disposable" ones, and by reducing household comsumption
of products. EPA estimates that 20 million tons (or 10%)
of the 1985 annual waste stream could be eliminated by a
waste reduction scenario that includes refillable beverage
containers, more durable automobile tires, and a 10% re-
7
duction in other packaging wastes. . Little progress has been
made in this direction so far; mandatory beverage container
deposit laws ("bottle bills") are the most visible achievement
to date.
Together, source separation and centralized MSW pro-
cessing constitute resource recovery -- the recovery of
materials or energy (or both) from MSW. Source separation,
because it is simple and requires little capital investment,
is considered a "low technology" approach to resource recovery.
Conversely, centralized MSW processing, using complex proces-
sing equipment and being capital intensive, is often called
a "high technology". Both approaches have the effect of
15
reducing our reliance on landfills for MSW disposal and
supplementing our use of primary mater'ials and/or energy.
Source separation (or low technology resource recovery)
is defined as the setting aside of recyclable waste materials
at their point of generation for segregated collection and
8
transport to secondary material markets. Transportation may
be provided by the waste generator, by city collection
vehicles, by private haulers, or by voluntary recycling
organizations. There are two principal types of source
separation programs of concern to municipalities: curbside
*
separate collection and the community recycling center.
Under a curbside separate collection program, recyclable
materials are collected at curbside on a regular basis, saving
the resident or business from having to transport the materials.
A recent EPA survey found 218 such programs in the U.S. Vir-
tually all programs collect paper (newsprint or mixed waste
paper); only 16% and 14% collect glass and metal, respectively.
In most cases (57%), separate collection is performed by the
municipality -- private collection firms and community organ-
9
izations operate 29% and 12% of the programs, respectively.
With a community recycling center, the participant is
required to deliver recyclable materials to a central col-
* Other separate collection programs are more specialized:
industry-sponsored recycling (such as aluminum can re-purchase
programs), office paper recycling, and commercial and industrial
source separation (eg. supermarkets segragating such products
as corrugated paper).
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lection point. Following Earth Day in 1970, thousands of
recycling centers sprang up in the U.S. Typically, a re-
cycling center will accept several materials -- paper, glass,
(either mixed of color-sorted), "tin' cans, aluminum cans,
and perhaps other waste products as well. The center may
be municipally-operated, or, more likely, operated by a
private contractor or community organization. Until recently,
recycling centers did not pay for waste material; recent
years have seen the establishment of a few "buy-back"
programs that pay participants a per-pound price for spe-
cified materials, such as paper or aluminum.
Several communities in California use an "integrated"
approach to source separation, which combines these two
principal programs and perhaps others. Such a program might
include curbside separate collection, a drop-off recycling
center, a buy-back program, and a system of satellite drop-
off facilities. This approach allows participants to select
the program that they prefer, and may enhance community par-
ticipation.
All of the above low-technology approaches require
markets for recovered materials. Often, materials are sold
on an irregular basis as storage bins fill -- in only
a few cases do recycling programs have contracts with material
buyers. Recycling programs currently divert about 9 million
tons of MSW annually from the waste stream -- or 6% of total
10
MSW tonnage in 1975. Over 90% of this tonnage is comprised
17
of various paper wastes. EPA estimates that source separ-
ation has the potential to divert as much as 50 million tons
of MSW per year by 1985.
To summarize, recycling diverts a relatively small
percentage of a community's MSW (in the range of 1-25% by
weight). It has low initial cost and operating costs, and
can be quickly planned and developed. It has a low oppor-
tunity cost, being flexible and adaptible to changing MSW
volume or composition. It requires considerable public
support and participation to be effective. Finally, it
has a low financial risk, due to its low initial cost and
flexibility.
High-technology resource recovery involves the central-
ized processing of mixed MSW, in order to separate recyclable
materials and convert the remaining fraction into an energy
product -- dry fuel, steam, or electricity. There are a
wide variety of centralized MSW processing technologies,
with varying degrees of complexity, cost, and demonstrated
feasibility. Energy and materials recovery technologies
can be combined in a variety of ways. Only three processes
have been widely used thus far, however: waterwall combus-
tion (mostly in Europe), composting (mostly in Europe),
and magnetic separation of ferrous scrap. In the U.S., two
other processes have been proven commercially to a lesser
extent -- modular incineration with heat recovery, and refuse-
derived fuel (RDF) processing.
18
In waterwall combustion, MSW is burned directly in
large waterwall furnaces, generally without any pre-processing.
The primary product is steam, which can be used directly
(for industrial processes) or converted .to electricity. In
some cases, MSW is first shredded to facilitate materials
recovery; ferrous metals can be recovered either before or
after incineration. Waterwall units are widely used in
Europe and Japan; in 1975 there were seven units completed
in the U.S. Plant capacity has ranged from 300 to 1,600
tons per day (TPD); recently proposed plants have been still
11
larger -- up to 3,000 TPD.
Small-scal.e modular incinerators recover heat in the
form of steam or hot water, usually without any materials
recovery. A modular plant consists of a series of small
identical furnaces. MSW is incinerated in two stages:
the first stage is a starved-air combustion process, pro-
ducing a combustible gas. The gas is then burned with an
auxiliary fuel (oil of gas) in a secondary combustion
chamber. The two-stage process reduces particulate emissions
12
and provided more complete combustion. This technology
was developed for hospitals, schools, and other institutions,
and was recently adapted to mixed MSW. In 1975, only three
communities in the U.S. had developed modular incinerators
with heat recovery; these units had capacities of 20-50 TPD.
More recent plants have a wider range of capacity -- up to
200 TPD.
19
Refuse-derived fuel systems produce RDF by separating
MSW and mechanically removing the organic (combustible)
fraction -- using a "wet" or "dry" process. The fuel
product is termed "fluff" RDF, "densified" RDF, or "powdered"
RDF, depending on subsequent processing. RDF is used as a
fuel supplement in conventional coal-fired boilers --
usually in an 80% coal - 20% RDF mixture. At an RDF plant,
refuse is first shredded, and then separated into a light
and heavy fraction, using an air classifier. Ferrous (and
perhaps other) metals are recovered from the heavy fraction;
the light fraction is RDF. There were four operating RDF
plants in the .U.S. in 1975, with another 20 either being
constructed or at the advanced planning stage. Plant scale
has varied greatly -- from a 200:TPD facility in Ames, Iowa,
to a 6,000 TPD plant in St. Louis, Missouri.
Other centralized processing technologies are either
commercially unproven or lack markets for their products
in the U.S. -- composting is a good example of the latter
situation. Several technologies are in an experimental or
demonstration phase: pyrolysis (the partial decomposition
of MSW to yield a gas and/or liquid fuel), anaerobic diges-
tion (the biological degradation of MSW by micro-organisms
in the absence of oxygen), and various materials-recovery
processes to isolate glass, aluminum, and non-ferrous
metals.
Including all centralized processing technologies, there
were 21 operational resource recovery plants in 1975; another
20
10 were under construction, 33 were in advanced planning,
13
and 54 were under study. Centralized MSW processing has
been estimated to cost $15-32 per ton depending on the
technology used; energy and material revenues range from
14
$5 to $17 per ton, leaving net costs of $3-21 per ton.
Given very limited commercial experience with a range of
different technologies, these cost and revenue estimates
are necessarily rough.
High-technology resource recovery differs strikingly
in many respects from recycling. It diverts a much larger
percentage of MSW (in the range of 50-90% by weight), acting
more as a substitute for conventional disposal than as a
way of reducing disposal needs. It has high initial costs
and, partly as a consequence, requires a much longer lead
time -- on the order of 3-8 years. It has a much higher
opportunity cost, due to the long financing period (typically
20-30 years) and lack of operating flexibility. Finally,
it has a much higher. financial risk, due to the volatility
of net operating costs, high initial costs, and limited
experience with the various recovery technologies.
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Notes
1. Michael Greenberg, "Suggestions for Evaluating Resource
Recovery Proposals", AIP Journal, January 1977, p. 25.
2. Congress of the United States, Office of Technology
Assessment, Materials and Energy from Municipal Waste,
Volume I (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO), July 1975, p. 24.
3. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Fourth Report to
Congress: Resource Recovery and Waste Reduction (Wash-
ington, D.C.: U.S. GPO), 1977, p. 20.
4. Marchant Wentworth, Resource Recovery: Truth & Consequ-
ences (Washington, D.C.: Environmental Action Foundation),
1977, p. 75.
5. U.S. EPA, op.cit., p.4.
6. U.S. EPA, op.cit., p.4.
7. U.S. EPA, op.cit., p.7.
8. U.S. EPA, op.cit., p.32.
9. U.S. Environmental Protection' Agency, A National Survey
of Separate Collection Programs, by David Cohen, SW-778
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO), 1979, p. 2.
10. U.S. EPA, Fourth Report, op.cit., p. 32.
11. U.S. EPA, Fourth Report, op.cit., p. 47.
12. Congress of the United States, op.cit., p. 255.
13. U.S. EPA, Fourth Report, op.cit., pp. 47-49.
14. Congress of the United States, op.cit., p. 130.
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III. THE ISSUE OF APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY
Given the two generic approaches to resource recovery
described in section II, what is the appropriate technology
issue and why is it important? The low-versus-high tech-
nology debate revolves aroung patterns of resource utili-
zation and consumption as much as it does MSW disposal.
Advocates of the low-technology approach find the United
States' prolific rate of resource extraction and consumption
untenable. They see source separation (and recycling) as
a way to sensitize citizens to the problems of excessive
consumption, and as a prelude to serious efforts at waste
reduction. High-technology proponents see nothing amiss
with U.S. consumption habits, and see centralized MSW pro-
cessing as a reasonable way to cope with the resulting waste.
The debate has focused mainly on national issues of
resource policy: the relative energy efficiency of low-
versus-high technology approaches, their implications for
levels of resource exploitation and consumption, their
effect on MSW generation rates and patterns, and their
effect on secondary materials markets and flows.
The appropriate technology issue also concerns scale:
the size of and degree of local control over a resource
recovery program. Low-technology advocates argue that large,
23
multi-community energy recovery plants are deleterious to
a community's right to manage its own affairs and problems.
Until recently, high-technology meant large-scale; it was
generally assumed that centralized MSW processing plants
required large volumes of solid waste to be economically
viable. The modular incinerator technology now makes small-
scale plants possible. But centralized MSW processing is
still a capital-intensive approach, requiring communities
to make long-term commitments and hence reducing local
control over MSW issues in the future.
Proponents of each persuasion use a variety of argu-
ments to support their position. Low-technology advocates,
including environmental organizations and community groups,
argue that the high-technology approach perpetuates -- and
even encourages -- high levels of waste generation, since
plant economics favor the full utilization of plant capacity.
Resource recovery plants are portrayed as being inflexible,
unable to cope with changes in MSW composition, and pre-
cluding low-technology efforts at materials recovery. Large
processing plants often require communities contributing
MSW to sign long-term contracts, and virtually all high-
technology systems involve long-term financing. These
commitments are thought to dramatically reduce local
control over a hitherto local responsibility. High-tech-
nology systems produce significant amounts of air pollutants,
including potentially hazardous materials, as well as waste-
water (from ash quenching) and residues that must be properly
24
treated. Centralized processing plants are considered to
be financially risky and unreliable, having high initial
costs and utilizing new and often commercially-unproven
technologies.
Low-technology advocates point out that source separation
strategies do a better job of separating recyclable materials,
producing a higher-quality product with higher resale value.
Low technology systems require modest capital investment and
can be implemented relatively quickly. Finally, source
separation is feasible in communities too small to consider
centralized MSW processing.
High-technology advocates -- the resource recovery
* *
industry , the beverage container industry, and some state
and regional agencies -- paint a different picture. They
argue that low-technology systems recover a relatively small
fraction of MSW, and thus do not address the issues of land-
fill capacity and cost. Recycling is considered uneconomical,
depending on "free" household separation and (often) subsi-
dized labor. It is thought to be unreliable, depending on
volatile material markets (which would be saturated by any
major shift to recycling). The argue that recycling will
not work in dense urban areas, being viable only in affluent,
* Recent developments in modular incinerator systems dilute
this argument somewhat.
** Firms with experience in energy/materials recovery and
related fields -- chemical engineering, boiler design, and
pollution control, for example.
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well-educated, white-collar suburbs. Finally, recycling
is thought to reduce the energy value of MSW, making energy
recovery less attractive.
Proponents of high-technology systems see them as a
more direct approach to the problems of diminishing disposal
capacity and rising energy prices. High-technology approaches
reduce the amount of MSW requiring disposal dramatically,
minimizing landfill needs and impacts. They point to the
commercially-proven resource recovery industry in Europe.
Finally, centralized MSW processing is expected to be more
economical -- especially in the future, with rising landfill
costs and energy prices.
Implicit in the appropriate technology debate is the
assumption that low and high technology approaches are in-
compatible. In theory, at least, this is not necessarily so.
Several recent studies argue that low and high technology
approaches may be quite compatible, and that their com-
bination may in fact be desirable. The arguments are theor-
etical and are based on averaged data for various parameters,
such as MSW composition, since the authors can cite no actual
examples of combined resource recovery systems.
EPA scientist John Skinner has demonstrated that source
separation (i.e. low-technology) and energy recovery (i.e.
high-technology) are compatible, at least conceptually.
With a MSW composition similar to the national average, he
predicts that a source separation program removing 60% of
26
all paper from the waste stream would reduce the energy
value of MSW by less than 9%.
In determining the compatibility of high and low tech-
nology approaches, sequencing matters; compatibility is more
likely if high-technology resource recovery is developed
after a low-technology source separation program. Effective
source separation enables a city to plan for a smaller
resource recovery plant without jeopardizing its feasibility.
This reduces the capital cost of the plant (for a given
service area) and increases the per-ton material revenues;
paper is worth more as fiber than as a fuel, and source
separation produces a cleaner, more valuable product in
general. Conversely, developing a source separation program
may reduce the revenues and profitability of an existing
resource recovery plant. This is especially true if the
plant is designed to receive MSW with a high energy value
or if it incorporates expensive materials processing equip-
ment.
Combining high and low technology systems may in fact
yield advantages. Source separation removes abrasive glass
and metal from the waste stream, thereby increasing the
life of resource recovery plant equipment. Source separation
removes much of the non-combustible fraction, increasing
the energy value of the incoming MSW. An intensive source
separation program could obviate the need for processing at
a central plant, reducing the capital and operating costs of
27
some resource recovery technologies, especially RDF. Perhaps
most importantly, a combination of high and low technology
approaches is more flexible. It can adapt more easily to
changing MSW volumes and composition due to a lower level
of capitalization and fewer long-term commitments.
The prospect of the two approaches to resource recovery
being compatible is of mixed value. It does not resolve the
appropriate technology question, since the issues of resource
utilization and consumption are largely unaffected. Energy
recovery, with or without recycling, still requires a steady
flow of MSW, reinforcing present consumption and waste
generation habits. It does, however, provide a somewhat
richer set of options for communities considering resource
recovery. Some ccmbination of the two approaches may better
meet a municipality's needs and objectives than either approach
alone.
Notes
1. Congress of the United States, Office of Technology
Assessment, Materials and Energy from Municipal W-aste,.
Volume I (Washington, D.C.: GPO), July 1979, pp. 83-85.
2. Marchant Wentworth, Resource Recovery: Truth & Consequ-
ences (Washington, D.C. : Environmental Action Foundation),
1977, pp. 57-58.
28
IV. CASE STUDY 1: MARBLEHEAD, MASSACHUSETTS
In 1972, the town of Marblehead, Massachusetts, took
over a recycling program from a local community group and
started a curbside collection program for four materials:
newsprint, metal cans, clear glass, and colored glass. In
1975, after closing its incinerator and arranging for private
hauling and landfilling, the town applied for and received
a federal grant to upgrade its separate collection program.
Since then, the program has enjoyed a very high participation
rate, consistently diverting 25% (by weight) of the town's
MSW from the waste stream, and generating a small fiscal
surplus.
The case illustrates several facets of the low-versus-
high technology resource recovery choice. It reinforces the
importance of community support for a successful recycling
program, and suggests that, where marginal disposal costs
are high, recycling can reduce net ksolid waste management
costs. The case also suggests that low and high technology
approaches may be compatible, and that a community will use
different criteria to evaluate each.
Background
Marblehead is an affluent suburban community in the
29
Figure 2 Location Map: Marblehead, Massachusetts
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Boston metropolitan region about 17 miles north of Boston.
2
The town had a 1970 population of 21,300. It has experienced
moderate growth since 1950, and expects a lower rate of
population growth in the future: the town Comprehensive Plan
projects a 1990 population of 28,400. The median income in
1970 was $12,184, considerably above the Massachusetts
3
average. Seventy percent of all households live in single-
family homes.
Marblehead is governed by a Board of Selectmen; major
legislative decisions are made at an annual Town Meeting.
4
Municipal employees are unionized. The town has only
limited commercial and industrial activity, with most
residents employed outside the community. Summer tourism
has declined in economic importance, but the service industry
5
in Marblehead is an important and growing sector.
The town currently (1979) generates about 9,150 tons
per year (TPY) of residential MSW, including recyclables,
and another 2,250 TPY of commercial MSW -- a total of 11,400
6
TPY, of 31 tons per day. This generation rate has been
relatively stable over time, with only minor seasonal
fluctuations, being slightly higher in the summer due to
additional summer residents. Table 2 estimated MSW generation
for Marblehead over several years.
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TABLE 2 MARBLEHEAD MSW GENERATION RATES
1970 1975 1980
1
Population 21,300 23,500 25,000
2
MSW (tons per year)
Residential 7,800 8,600 9,150
Commercial 1,900 2,100 2,250
Total 9,700 10,700 11,400
1. 1970 and 1975 data from Community Profile; 1980 data
projection from town's Comprehensive Plan.
2. 1980 data based on personal communication with Raymond
Reed, Health Department Director. Other data derived
by author on a proportional basis.
Residential collection is performed by the town Health
Department, under the Board of Health, a nearly autonomous
agency in charge of all public health matters, including
7
refuse collection and disposal. Private firms collect
refuse for commercial businesses and multiple-unit residences.
The Health Department used to operate the town landfill, later
the town incinerator, and now runs the recycling program and
transfer station. MSW collection and disposal costs are
paid from the town general fund and are included in the
8
town's tax rate.
Chronology
Marblehead acquired a small (16 acre) site for its
landfill in 1955. Due to its limited capacity, the town
in the early 1960s built an incinerator at the site. Its
capital cost was about $275,000, spread over ten years.
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Incineration residuals -- about 10% by weight -- were land-
filled on the site.
In the early 1970s, the high school Ecology Club started
a drop-off recycling center where residents could bring news-
print, glass, and cans on weekends. The program was quite
popular and gained community attention. In 1972, a group of
environmental-minded citizens, led by Carl King, a local
attorney, proposed that the town sponsor an intensive re-
9
cycling program. At the May 1972 Town Meeting, their proposal
for mandatory source separation and separate collection of
10
recyclables was introduced by King and passed as a by-law.
Town officials took no strong position on. the issue. The
Health Board, while sympathetic to the program's resource
conservation goals, was skeptical about implementation; the
by-law provided no additional funds or instructions for Health
11
Department implementation.
The separate collection program commenced operations
later in 1972. Due to limited publicity and a confusing
collection schedule (the Department collected a different
material each week) participation was only moderate, but the
program nonetheless recycled about 14-18% (by weight) of
residential MSW.
In 1974, EPA tested stack emissions at the town's
incinerator and informed local officials that they would
have to either reduce emissions significantly or phase out
33
the plant. The Health Board decided that upgrading the plant
would be too costly, and began investigating other options.
The Health Department looked at several regional resource
recovery projects, all still in the planning stages -- RESCO
in Saugus, NESWC in Haverhill, and SESWC in Peabody -- but
doubted that they would be developed in time. Two Health
Board members visited Consumat's modular incinerator at
Wellesley, Massachusetts, and were not impressed with facility
12
reliability and safety. The Department considered a baling
process to reduce MSW volume prior to disposal at the town's
existing landfill; limited capacity ruled out this option,
except in the very short term. After further EPA pressure
to act, the Board eventually decided to develop a transfer
station and pay to have-its MSW hauled elsewhere. In April
1975, the Health Board signed a five-year contract with
Service Company of America (SCA), whereby SCA would (at no
cost to the town) build the transfer station, and haul MSW
to a private landfill in Amesbury, Massachusetts, for a
tipping fee of $18.95 per ton. The station was built and
the incinerator closed in August 1975.
The new disposal fee represented nearly a doubling of
the town's per-ton disposal cost, and the Board was eager to
13
reduce costs. With a niew incentive to reduce MSW tonnage,
the Board met with a consultant -- Resource Planning
Associates (RPA) -- and applied to EPA for support in up-
grading their separate collection program. In June 1975,
EPA awarded an $80,000 grant to the town as part of a
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demonstration project (also including the city of Somerville,
Massachusetts). With the funds, the Department spent $40,000
on two multi-material collection vehicles, reserving the
other half for project monitoring and studies by RPA.
Resource recovery system and results
The 1972 program required residents to separate MSW into
five categories: newsprint, clear glass, colored glass,
metal cans, and non-recyclable refuse. Each week, the Health
Department would collect a different recyclable material, in
addition to its twice-weekly refuse collection. The Depart-
ment used existing staff and equipment (i.e. conventional
packer trucks). Recycled materials were stored at the land-
fill site and sold on a non-contract basis directly to
material buyers in the region with no intermediate processing.
The alternating collection schedule was necessary because
buyers needed a "clean" product, and the packer trucks could
not separate materials.
After 2 1/2 years of operation, program results were
mixed. The program was recycling between 1,200 and 1,600
TPY of materials, an'impressive 14-18% of total residential
14
solid waste, in contrast to the U.S. average of 2% for all
15
recycling programs. Program participation was consistently
16
good -- 30-40% of all households participated regularly.
These results were obtained despite minimal program publicity
and the Health Board's decision not to actively enforce the
mandatory separation provisions of the 1972 by-law. However,
35
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the program had a net cost of $43,000 in 1973 -- a figure
that probably applies to other years. Total solid waste
management costs (collection, recycling, and disposal)
in 1973 were approximately $265,000, or about $32 per ton.
Without recycling, disposal costs would have been unchanged,
18
and slightly lower -- betwee $27 and $32.
The revised recycling program started in January 1976,
differed in many ways from the previous system. Recyclable
materials were divided into only three groups: newsprint,
clear glass and cans, and colored glass and cans. Two
compartmentalized trucks allowed the Health Department to
simultaneously collect several materials. Initially, the
Department provided twice-weekly refuse collection and once-
weekly collection of all*eparated materials. In mid-1977,
the Department reduced refuse collection to once per week.
High participation rates had reduced refuse tonnage signi-
ficantly; the change offered substantial collection cost
savings; and residents agreed to less frequent service.
Marblehead entered into a one-year contract with Recor,
Inc. (later Matcon, Inc.) of Salem, Massachusetts, an inter-
mediate processor willing to purchase mixed materials. The
contract specified "floor" prices for all materials, delivered
to Salem by the Health Department. The contract was not re-
newed in 1977 when the two parties could not agree on a price
*Only mixed glass and cans required processing.
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schedule, but Matcon continued to purchase all of the town's
19
recovered materials. Matcon complained at times about the
level of contamination of the paper and glass/metal products
-- with other MSW -- but on the whole Marblehead's residents
did a good job of separating recyclable materials.
In the first 2 1/2 years (January 1976 to June 1978),
the program has consistently recycled over 150 TPM, averag-
ing 175 TPM (or 2,100 TPY). This tonnage represents 25% of
residential solid waste generated in Marblehead. The
fraction of households participating has ranged between 60%
20
and 74% . The program has resulted in a net savings of
$45,000 over its first 2 1/2 years. Total solid waste
management costs in 1977 were about $294,000 (including
collection, recycling, and disposal) -- or $34 per ton.
Without the separate collection program, this total would
21
have been about $311,900, or $36 per ton. Thus, separate
collection saved the town about $17,000 per year, or" $2 per
**
ton. Table 3 gives economic results for 1976 and 1977.
This net savings, while slight, is not terribly
sensitive to changes in participation rates (i.e. the per-
centage of residential MSW recycled). Net savings (or cost)
is much more a function of market prices for recovered
* Matcon, Inc. has since gone out of business, and Marble-
head now sells mixed glass and cans to Recycle Enterprises
in Oxford, Massachusetts, and newsprint to a firm in Salem.
**Separate collection program costs were more than offset
by material revenues plus disposal credits.
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materials. Between 1976 and 1978, market prices for glass
cullet were fairly stable($10-12/ton), but due to market
fluctuations for secondary materials, newsprint and can
prices were quite volatile ($12-28/ton and $10-30/ton,
22
respectively).
TABLE 3 MARBLEHEAD PROGRAM COSTS AND REVENUES
1976 1977
Recycled Materials
Revenues
Material sales $35,600 $25,500
Disposal credits 40,100 41,100
Subtotal 75,700 66,600
Cost 47 , 900 49,800
Net Revenue (Cost) $27,800 $16,800
Remaining MSW
Collection Costs 149,600 146,700
Disposal Costs 124,600 123,900
Total $274,200 $270,600
Source: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Multi-material
Source Separation in Marblehead and Somerville, Massachusetts:
Collection and Marketing, SW-822 (Washington, D.C. - U.S. GPO),
December 1979, pp. 47-48
Resource Recovery Choice
The town in fact made three separate choices concerning
resource recovery -- a 1972 decision to get involved in an
existing recycling program, an early-1975 decision to build
a transfer station and pay for private disposal, and a 1975
decision to upgrade the materials recovery program. Each
responded to a different situation and employed different
criteria; they are discussed in turn.
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The 1972 decision to start separate collection was made
at Town Meeting with the backing of a group of "do-gooders",
the new by-law was passed in the spirit of taking local action
to address a national resource conservation issue. Town
government was unprepared for such an endeavor, and some
officials felt the proposal has been "slipped through" at
23
Town Meeting without sufficient discussion. Health Board
chairman Bruce Humphrey notes that the Board had no funds
to initiate a separate collection program; nobody had thought
through the actual implementation of the by-law. Despite
this lack of preparation, the new program held some promise
for the Health Department. Incinerator stack emissions were
a source of local concern and a program that reduced MSW
tonnage would also reduce the level of incinerator emissions
and residuals requiring disposal at the town's hard-pressed
landfill.
Clearly, the 1972 decision was elective.- Marblehead
was not yet under pressure to modify its incinerator, and
disposal costs were not excessive. Annual operating costs
24
at the incinerator averaged $85,000 in the early 1970s, or
about $10.90 per ton. Recycling efforts were not intended
to provide the town cost savings, either; annual incinerator
costs were fairly insensitive to minor changes in tonnage.
In 1975, the town faced a much different situation.
Under pressure from EPA, the Health Board had to either
upgrade its incinerator or find a new disposal option. The
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ch-oice was essentially a short-term one, and was made by
25
the Health Board with no need for town approval. The Board
investigated a broad range of options, including upgrading
the incinerator, a small "package" incinerator, MSW baling
(and on-site landfilling), participation in a regional resource
recovery project, and a transfer station. The Board was con-
vinced that no new landfill sites within the town remained.
Some town officials -- ex-Board members -- favored up-
grading the incinerator, given its good performance in the
past and existing staff commitments. But the plant did not
come close to meeting federal air quality standards, and
the Board agreed that this option was too costly. Board
chairman Humphrey was also reluctant to improve the facility
with no guarantee that it would subsequently meet emissions
standards. Another Massachusetts community had recently
paid for extensive incinerator modifications and still ex-
ceeded federal standards. Humphrey, and possibly other
Board members, felt hemmed in by EPA, and doubted that any
local disposal strategy -- incineration or landfilling --
would meet EPA standards.
Needing a short-term solution, the Board could not
wait for regional resource recovery to become a reality.
Most of the then-proposed projects were not close to con-
struction, and Health Department director Raymond Reed
expected RESCO (in Saugus) to be too expensive, given its
distance from Marblehead and anticipated tipping fees.
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Also, regional resource recovery was seen as a "political
football"; town officials expected facility siting to be a
26
major obstacle. Overall, the Board found the transfer station
option preferable on several grounds: it provided an immediate
solution to their acute disposal problem; SCA would build
the facility at no cost to the town (other options required
considerable front-end investments); and it had a very low
opportunity cost. The last factor was particularly important;
given that local disposal was thought to be infeasible, a
transfer station was needed in any case, and the Board wanted
to be able to join in a regional resource recovery program
if one should prove successful in the future.
The town's existing materials recovery program was not
a factor in this choice. The program was diverting a rela-
tivQly small fraction of total MSW tonnage, and was not in
itself a disposal option. Marblehead's recycling program
was not, however, an impediment to participation in planned
regional plants. Although the town made no commitment to
any of the several regional proposals, its MSW composition
(and the recycling program's effect on composition) was
27
not an issue during discussions.
Having selected an option which substantially increased
per-ton disposal costs, the town in 1975 had a strong in-
centive to reduce MSW tonnage via its separate collection
program. Unlike the 1972 choice, the town now stood to gain
significant cost savings for each ton of MSW recycled (and
41
hence diverted from the transfer station). In economic terms,
the marginal cost of disposal was high -- $19 per ton -- and
provided economic incentives to generate less solid waste.
Regardless of disposal costs, the recycling program had
remained quite popular since it inception, and Marblehead's
resource conservation efforts were a source of pride to both
residents and town officials. Therefore, when Humphrey
learned of EPA's demonstration grant program for materials
recovery, the Board readily agreed to apply for such a grant.
The Board's choice to upgrade its program was a fairly direct
result of the incentives created by its disposal decision
earlier that year.
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V. CASE STUDY 2: EL CERRITO, CALIFORNIA
El Cerrito has a fairly long history of recycling,
beginning with a volunteer-run recycling center in 1972. The
city assumed control of the program in 1977, expanding it
significantly as a demonstration project in multi-material
recycling within a small community. As part of a long-range
community plan to reduce MSW tonnage by 25%, the center now
receives about 350 tons per month (TPM) of recyclables, and
predicts 500 TPM in'.the near future. The program currently
diverts about 18% of El Cerrito' s MSW.
El Cerrito's experience underscores the importance of
strong community support and able program administration and
leadership. Also important were good secondary material
markets and the availability of various grants to help the
program get started. El Cerrito's choice about resource
recovery was elective; it was not forced of hastened by high
disposal costs or a serious shortage of landfill capacity.
Background
El Cerrito is a suburban community about eight miles
north of Oakland, California, and is part of the heavily
urbanized East Bay area. It borders the cities of Albany
and Richmond, and Kensington, an unincorporated community.
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El Cerrito had a 1975 population of 23,000, slightly less
1
than the 1970 level. The 1975 median income was $15,056;
both this and the average level of education are above the
U.S. average.
Refuse collection in El Cerrito is performed by the
East Bay Sanitary Service under a long-term franchise agree-
ment, which permits annual rate adjustment. Kensington and
Albany have similar franchise arrangements. El Cerrito
residents currently pay $5.00 per month for one-can-per-week
service and $2.00 per month for an additional can. East Bay
Sanitary Service hauls refuse directly to a regional landfill
in Richmond -- the West Contra Costa county landfill, privately
owned and operated, and located about five miles from El
Cerrito. Commercial haulers are charged a $4.00 per ton
tipping fee. The West Contra Costa county landfill is located
in a wetland area, and has up to 40-50 years of remaining
capacity, despite frequent violations of state environmental
standards and a running legal battle with the State Lands
2
Commission over title to part of the site.
El Cerrito generates an average of 690 TPM of residential
and 110 TPM of commercial refuse, a total of 800 TPM of MSW --
3
or 9,600 tons per year. The recycling program also serves
the towns of Kensington (1975 population of 5,300) and Albany
(population of 14,700), each generating 100 and 650 TPM of
MSW respectively.
45
Chronology
El Cerrito's recycling program began in 1972 when Ken
Little, a city employee, started a small recycling center --
E.C.ology -- with the support of city councilmen Gregg Cook
and Ernie Del Simone. It was a weekend drop-off facility,
staffed by volunteers, accepting a variety of materials.
The program was well-received and attracted users from near-
by Albany and Kensington. A glass crusher was added, and the
center received a small but steady supply of glass, paper,
4
and metal cans -- about 15 TPM. Local environmentalists in
1974 persuaded the center's founders to establish a Board of
Directors to administer the program and coordinate its
5
activities with other local environmental programs. The
volunteer Board was intended to :create more visible links
with the El Cerrito community.
At this time, El Cerrito had several unfilled CETA
positions, and Charles Papke, a local resident and activist,
proposed to the city's Parks and Recreation Department that
he be hired to develop -plans for an expanded recycling program.
City officials were interested because of the state legislature's
1972 Solid Waste Management and Resource Recovery Act, which
among other things mandated local solid waste management plans
and proposed a 25% reduction in the amount of MSW requiring
disposal by 1980. The city council approved Papke's hiring,
but reluctantly. Council members supported the small private
recycling center but were not ready to commit city funds to
such a project.
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Working under Parks and Recreation Department director
Joel Witherell, Papke established a Citizen's Solid Waste
Advisory Committee. The Committee was composed of community
leaders and city officials, and was intended to oversee
planning efforts and develop community awareness of and support
for the recycling program. Papke studied other intensive
recycling programs -- in Modesto and Davis, then the two
largest programs in California. Surveys by the Parks and
Recreation Department showed a large majority of households
in El Cerrito willing to participate-in a curbside collection
6
program for recyclables. Papke proposed an "integrated"
recycling program having several components, including drop-
off facilities, a buy-back program, and a curbside collection
program. In this way, Papke hoped to combine the profitability
of the buy-back approach with the high participation rates
of the curbside collection approach.
Papke and the Committee also examined material markets
and grant sources. Kaiser Aluminum at that time had a nation-
wide system of aluminum buy-back centers to promote aluminum
can recycling; Kaiser was willing to consider an arrangement
whereby the E.C.ology program would perform this function in
the East Bay area. The 1972 state Act also established a
state Solid Waste Management Board (SWMB) and made the Board
responsible for allocating funds' from a demonstration grant
program for resource recovery projects. The Parks and Rec-
reation Department in 1976 applied for a SWMB grant to
finance the capital improvements recommended by Papke.
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The Department also applied for grants from CETA and the
state Employment Development Department to staff the proposed
expansion.
A central feature of Papke's long-range plan was that
the city would assume control of the recycling program.
There were several reasons for this proposal. The Advisory
Committee was convinced that program administration would be
crucial and time consuming; the volunteer Board of Directors
7
lacked both organization and resources. The Board, lacking
non-profit corporate status, was also unable to secure grants
from various state and federal programs. In addition, Kaiser
Aluminum made their participation as a materials buyer con-
tingent on city involvement. In May 1977 the E.C.ology Board
of Directors agreed with Papke, recommending that the city's
Parks and Recreation Department take over the program in
8
order to spur more rapid expansion.
The full city council was less enthusiastic about the
proposal. Chief among their concerns was the city refuse
collector's opposition to the plan. East Bay Sanitary Service,
while unfamiliar with the plan's details, was sure that a
major and ongoing recycling effort would hurt its business
in the long run. The city's Public Works Department also
opposed the plan, noting that the proposed expansion was
risky, and that the program shouldn't be directed by the
9
Parks and Recreation Department in any case. The council
also worried about financing the program; they had no assurance
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of a grant from the SWMB and were unwilling to commit an
unspecified amount of city funds to the program's success.
Events in the following months lessened the council's
concerns. Papke and others were able to allay some (but
not all) -of the city refuse collectors' fears so that the
franchisee offered to provide separate collection service.
The city concluded a one-year contract with Kaiser Aluminum,
under which Kaiser would pay the E.C.ology program $12,000
and a per-ton price for aluminum scrap. Program proponents
could point to a ready source of financing, at least in the
short-term. Finally, the council and the Advisory Committee
held several joint workshops to inform community residents
of the proposal and gauge public response. The workshops
were well attended, and demonstrated to the council broad
support for the recycling proposal.
With a favorable recommendation from director Witherell,
the city council in July 1977 voted 3-2 to have the city's
Parks and Recreation Department assume responsibility for
the E.C..ology program in accordance with the plan prepared
by Papke for the Department. While clearly still divided
on the issue, a majority of council members were persuaded
of the program's viability, community support, and short-term
financial soundness. The council's approval was. for a one-
year trial period; the council members wanted to be able to
end city involvement after a year if the program proved
financially unsound. The council also decided to let
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E.C.ology do curbside collection of recyclables. East Bay
Sanitary Service had offered, for an extra dollar per month
per participating household, to collect recyclables, but
only on a trial basis, and with city guarantees to cover any
extra costs. Not knowing what additional costs to expect,
the council declined the firm's offer.
Later in 1977, the city received a $45,000 grant from
the state SWMB, and the Parks and Recreation Department began
administering the E.C.ology program with 12 CETA staff, the
SWMB grant, the Kaiser contract, and a modest advance of funds
10
from the city. Program expansion was preceded by an extensive
promotional program, including paid advertisement and door-
to-door canvassing. Monthly tonnage rose dramatically in
late 1977, and has increased steadily as the program has
expanded.
El Cerrito received a second state SWMB grant of $92,200
in May 1979 to reach a stated goal of 500 TPM, which the
city thought would enable the program to be self-supporting.
The program also received additional CETA staff, and the
state Department of Rehabilitation awarded a special grant
to a non-profit community health program to provide staff
assistance to E.C.ology. To accomodate its increasing
volume and in response to complaints about excessive traffic
in the neighborhood of the current location, the center will
soon move to a new site in El Cerrito -- one with improved
road and rail access,
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Resource recovery system and results
The 1972 recycling program consisted of a drop-off center
at the city's corporation yard. Staffed by volunteers and
open one Saturday per month, it accepted a variety of
materials: aluminum and tin cans, newsprint, magazines,
and color-sorted glass. Materials were sold to local buyers
on a highest-bidder basis when a sufficient volume had accum-
ulated. Over the course of several years, the center was
upgraded somewhat -- a glass crusher was added and volunteers
were paid for their work. During its first four years the
program received a fairly steady flow of materials, averaging
15 TPM -- or 180 tons per year.
The 1977 program expansion increased the center's work
area and provided new staff and equipment. The drop-off
program hours were expanded to every weekday, and four new
programs were added. A curbside collection program was made
available to all El Cerrito residents for a fee of $1.00 per
month (in addition to refuse collection fees) -- this -fee was
dropped several months later to increase participation. Six
household-separated materials were collected each week:
mixed glass, newsprint, magazines, aluminum cans, tin cans,
and reusable wine bottles. The program was expanded to
Kensington in June 1978 and to Albany in September 1979.
A buy-back program, also open on weekdays, accepted ten
different consumer-sorted materials: bundled newsprint,
corrugated cardboard, color-sorted glass, tin cans, aluminum
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cans, pure aluminum scrap, mixed aluminum scrap, and reusable
wine bottles. The program paid an advertised per-pound price
for each material, usually making a 25-50% mark-up on its
11
subsequent sale. Two other activities were added: a
commercial program, which collected materials from commercial
businesses in 2 cubic yard bins, and a satellite program,
which placed similar bins in smaller outlying communities
and multi-unit apartment complexes.
Program expansion also increased the service area --
the drop-off and buy-back programs serve residents of west
Contra Costa county and north Alameda county, with a combined
population of 150,000. From a pre-1977 level of 10-15 TPM,
materials volume grew to 100 TPM by July 1978, 250 TPM by
12
April 1979, and 350 TPM by October 1979. The curbside and
buy-back programs account for the majority of this tonnage --
45% and 44% respectively. Given different service areas for
different programs, calculating the reduction in MSW requiring
disposal is not straightforward. Witherell estimates an 18%
reduction in El Cerrito's tonnage; alternatively, assuming
that all recyclables originate in the three-town area, this
13
area has achieved a 23% reduction. Witherell estimates that
50% of El Cerrito's households participate in the curbside
program; this figure is 60% in Kensington.
The 1977 expansion also provided additional processing
equipment -- a paper baler and aluminum shredder -- which
reduced transportation costs and enabled the program to get
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higher prices for its materials. Over its lifetime,
E.C.ology has had access to good secondary material markets.
Consequently, the program has sold materials on a non-contract
basis to the highest bidder. Table 4 lists firms that
regularly purchase recycled materials.
EL CERRITO PROGRAM MATERIALS MARKETS
Material
Paper fiber
Ferrous metal
Aluminum
Glass
Oil (used)
Buyer
Consolidated Fiber
Engineered Waste
Sonoco
M&T
BHR
Levin
Reynolds Aluminum
Simon & Sons
Custom Alloy
BHR
Owens Illinois
Brockway
Circo
Encore
Ecotek
Liquid Gold
Location
Bay Area
If
B i
Bay Area
it
t o
Bay Area
Tacoma,, WA
Bay Area
Bay Area
to
Madera, CA
Bay Area
Bay Area
It
Source: City of El Cerrito, State Grant Application, Calif-
ornia Solid Waste Management Board (for E.C.ology Recycling
Center), December 1979, page 3.
E.C.ology usually ships materials to buyers. Much
of the paper fiber is sold for export, which explains the
Bay Area's strong secondary paper market.
Describing the economics of the E.C.ology program is
complicated by several factors: a lack of comparable data
TABLE 4
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since its 1977 expansion, relatively large and intermittent
capital costs, and a rapidly growing volume of materials
processed by the facility. Accurate information is not
available for the program's first fiscal year (1977-78);
Table 5 shows actual economic data for 1978-79 and the program's
1979-80 budget.
TABLE 5 EL CERRITO PROGRAM COSTS AND REVENUES
1978-79
Costs 1
Labor
City funded
CETA and Phoenix
Subtotal
Operating expenses
Administrative services
Capital improvements
Purchase expenses
Total
Revenues
Sale of materials
CETA and Phoenix grants
State SWMB grant
Total
Net Revenue (Cost)
2
$46,000
A
A & 46,000
57,000
30,000
0
110,000
A & $243,000
$219,000
A
0
A & $219,000
($24,000)
1979-80
$122,000
90,000
212,000
57,000
30,000
92,000
240,000
$631,000
$469,000
90,000
92,000
$651,000
$ 20,000
Source: City of El Cerrito, State Grant Application, Cali-
fornia Solid Waste Management Board(for E.C.ology Recycling
Center), December 1979, page 9 and City of El Cerrito
E.C.ology Recycling, Income Statement for FY 1978-79, July 18,
1979.
1. Information on the CETA/Phoenix contribution in 1978-79 is
not readily available. Labeled "A", it is in the range
$50,000 to $100,000.
2. "In-kind" services provided by the city including free use
of the site, fleet insurance rates, and management services.
3. Cash outlays from the buy-back program.
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As the table indicates, the program expects net revenues
of $20,000 in 1979-80, which will be used to reduce the out-
standing loan from the city. In 1978-79, the program produced
a small deficit. Clearly, the program is labor intensive;
this is largely due to the availability of CETA and Phoenix
employment development grants. In 1979-80, labor subsidies
represent 20% of the basic budget. The Department plans to
reduce this labor component and increase its use of processing
14
equipment when these grants end. This strategy, coupled with
increases in per-month tonnage processed, is expected to make
the program self-supporting by 1982.
Material prices are quite high; they average $113 per
ton in 1979-80. The center receives about $900/ton for
aluminum; $80/ton for cardboard, wine bottles, and used oil;
$65/ton for newsprint; $30/ton for glass and mixed paper; and
15
$25/ton for ferrous metals ("tin"cans). California is con-
sidered an "aluminum rich" state -- along with Arizona, New
Jersey, and some southern states -- due to its large soft-
drink market; as a result, aluminum constitutes a larger than
average fraction of MSW tonnage. As might be expected, total
project revenue is strongly affected by material prices, which
have increased significantly since 1977. But revenues are
also very sensitive to the aluminum fraction -- the percentage
of total recycled tonnage which is aluminum -- due to its high
per-ton price. At E.C.ology, the aluminum fraction is 5-10%;
this 5% range represents a 40% change in average per-ton revenue.
*Author's estimate, based on E.C.ology records.
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Resource Recovery Choice
El Cerrito's resource recovery choice was an elective
one. The city faced no pressures to change its solid waste
management practices; low disposal costs and ample landfill
capacity gave it no cause to consider disposal alternatives
While future enforcement of state landfilling standards at
the West Contra Costa county landfill could change both
conditions dramatically in the future, this possibility
did not enter into the city's decision. The state's goal
of reducing the amount of MSW requiring disposal was not
binding on communities, relying instead on goodwill efforts
by cities and counties (in fact many local governments have
made no or minimal effort to meet this goal).
El Cerrito's choice was fairly uncomplicated: whether or
not to assume control of an existing recycling program. The
city council made its formal decision in July 1977, but
city involvement in the program goes back to 1972, when the
city provided a site for the new center. The Parks and
Recreation Department devoted increasing attention to the
program, hiring Papke to study expansion options and applying
for state and federal grants on its behalf. By the time that
the city council was considering the proposal for city in-
volvement, many city staff and officials had already devoted
considerable energy to the project.
That is not to say that city council approval was anti-
climatic. The council had several serious reservations
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about involving the city in the E.C.ology program, and were
more-or-less satisfied with each issue before giving their
approval. A major concern was the city refuse collector's
opposition to the recycling proposal. Over several months,
this opposition subsided, following a lengthy interchange
between East Bay Sanitary Service and Parks and Recreation
Department staff. Community participation was another concern.
Papke's prior surveys of citizens' willingness to participate
were reassuring in this respect, and the early 1977 series
of workshops convinced the council that the recycling proposal
enjoyed wide community support.
In addition, the proposal received the endorsement and
support of several key officials. Two city council members
had helped start the recycling center in 1972 and remained
enthusiastic. Ex-councilman Ray Cook, who had the respect
of the council in general and was a popular public figure in
16
El Cerrito, also supported city involvement.
Project viability was another concern of the council:
would the project work, and could it be successfully admin-
istered by the city? The city council found Papke's plans
for expanding the recycling center reasonably complete and
accurate, and the contract with Kaiser Aluminum assured the
city of an aluminum market in the short term. Witherell
assured council members that his Department would have no
trouble administering the program; the council's approval
was in part an expression of their confidence in him.
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Finally, council members were concerned about the extent
of the city's financial commitment; they did not want to in
effect issue a blank check for the recycling program.
Although the SWMB grant and additional CETA allocations had
not yet been awarded, the council was reassured by the $12,000
Kaiser grant. Their use of a one-year trial period further
limited potential city expenditures.
Notes
1. City of El Cerrito, California, State Grant Application,
E.C.ology Recycling Center, to State Solid Waste Manage-
ment Board, December 1979, p. 2 (henceforth "Grant Appli-
cation").
2. Personal communication: Charles Papke, Resources Manage-
ment Associates, El Cerrito(and former city employee).
3. Grant Application, op.cit., p. 2.
4. Personal communication: Joel Witherell, Director of
Community Services Department (formerly Parks and
Recreation Department),City of El Cerrito.
5. Personal communication: Charles Papke.
6. Ibid.
7. Personal communication: Joel Witherell.
8. City of El Cerrito, Community Services Department,
E.C.ology Recycling, undated brochure (ca. 1979), p. 2.
9. Personal communication: Charles Papke.
10. Personal communication: Joel Witherell; and E.C.ology
Recycling, op.cit., p. 2.
11. Personal communication: Joel Witherell.
12. E.C.ology Recycling, op.cit., p. 3.
13. Author's estimate, assuming 350 TPM throughput.
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14. Personal communication: Joel Witherell.
15. Grant Application, op.cit., p. 9.
16. Personal communication: Charles Papke..
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VI. CASE STUDY 3: NORTH LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS
In 1976 the city of North Little Rock signed contracts
with an energy-recovery equipment vendor and a wood products
manufacturer to develop a small-scale modular incinerator
with heat recovery. The 100 TPD facility was designed to
incinerate all the city's refuse and supply steam to the
manufacturer, with the possibility of expanding to serve
new industries in the city's industrial expansion area.
The plant commenced operations in 1977 and, despite manage-
ment difficulties and a smaller-than-expected market for
steam, has operated successfully for two years, at a cost
competitive with landfill costs in the area.
North Little Rock's decision is of interest for several
reasons. City officials saw the energy recovery system
more as a way of promoting economic development in a region
facing a natural gas shortage, and less as a method of waste
disposal. The equipment vendor, and not the city, took the
lead in proposing and assessing the feasibility of energy
recovery. Several key individuals were crucial in gaining
support for the proposal and resolving obstacles to negotiations
between the city and the energy buyer.
Background
North Little Rock is located in the middle of the state,
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Figure 4 Location Map: North Little Rock, Arkansas
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across the Arkansas River from Little Rock, the capitol and
largest city in the state. North Little Rock's 1975 population
was 64,400 -- eleven percent above the 1960 level.
Residential densities are relatively low -- about
2,000 people per square mile. The city supports a diversity
of small industries, and is the center of the Missouri-Pacific
Railroad's repair and maintenance facilities. Median income
in 1970 was $8,467, significantly below the national average.
The city in 1975 generated a total of about 200 tons
per day (TPD) of solid waste -- 70 TPD of residential MSW
2
and the remainder commercial and industrial waste. Resi-
dential waste was collected.by the city's Sanitation Depart-
ment, and commercial and industrial waste by private haulers.
In the early 1970's, the Department hauled MSW to a private
landfill several miles north of town. This landfill clos.ed
after reaching capacity, and the city was forced to utilize
a more distant landfill in Jacksonville, about 12 miles
north of the city. The Jacksonville landfill, privately
owned and operated by the Arkansas Waste Disposal Company,
3
charged a tipping fee of $3.00 per ton.
City collection was financed by user fees, paid by
residents to the city. The Sanitation Department had a
budget ofabout $600,000; a 1975 study showed the Depart-
4
ment with an annual deficit of $42,000. In December 1975,
in order to make the Sanitation Department self-supporting,
the city raised the fees to $2.00 per month per household.
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Chronology
In 1971 North Little Rock purchased two 12.5 TPD
modular incinerators (without heat recovery) from Consumat
Systems, Inc., a major vendor of modular incinerator equip-
ment. City officials hoped to reduce hauling distances (and
thereby reduce collection costs) by establishing "satellite"
5
incinerators at different locations. North Little Rock's
large area and low population density made this proposal
attractive. The city undertook no extensive analysis prior
to their purchase. The two units were never installed due
to siting problems; city officials failed to find a site
that was acceptable to various neighborhood organizations.
North Little Rock already had several "smoke belching"
6
industries, and residents-feared -another.
In mid-1974, U.S. Recycle Corp. (USR), the franchise
dealer for Consumat in Arkansas, through the city Chamber
of Commerce, learned that Koppers Company was a major user
of steam for industrial processing. The Forest Products
Division of Koppers manufactured creosote-treated wood
products at its North Little Rock plant. USR proposed an
energy recovery plant burning municipal refuse that could
give Koppers a dependable steam supply. Koppers company
officials expressed considerable interest; they were aware
of an impending natural gas shortage in the Southeast, and
7
wished to avoid natural gas curtailments.
Later in 1974, USR approached then-mayor Eddie Powell
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with its energy recovery proposal. USR argued that the
system offered significant cost savings for the city in
the form of reduced MSW hauling costs. USR had already
successfully developed two other small-scale modular energy
recovery systems which sold steam to small manufacturing firms
-- in Siloam Springs and Blytheville, Arkansas. City officials,
especially the city council, were skeptical of the proposal;
they knew nothing of the technology and doubted that the
proposal could compete economically with landfilling. But
city officials were nonetheless willing to consider the
proposal; they wanted to do something about the two units
purchased in 1971 (which the city had been storing), and
they realized that Koppers Company was important to the city,
8
providing jobs and substantial tax revenues. Mayor Powell
was optimistic that the plant would produce excess steam
which could be used to attract new industrial development,
9
a high priority for the economically depressed town.
Initial discussions between the city and Koppers were
encouraging; Koppers re-af firmed its support for th-e prQject
and persuaded city officials that the plant could reliably
meet their steam requirements. During this period (1974-75),
tipping fees at the private landfill in Jacksonville rose
10
dramatically -- from $3 to $11 per ton. This increase in
disposal costs did not cause city officials to worry about
future landfill shortages, but it did make USR's proposal
more economically attractive.
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In early 1975, USR became concerned about the city's
MSW collection system,- fearing that a haphazard system would
not provide a reliable stream of MSW to the energy recovery
facility. At the firm's urging, North Little Rock sponsored
a study of the city's solid waste management activities,
using funds from a HUD-funded Management Assistance Program.
The city's planning consultant in turn subcontracted the
work to USR, citing the latter's familiarity with the city's
solid waste situation.
USR made its report to the city in August 1975, recom-
mending 26 actions to improve the efficiency and revenue-
producing ability of the Sanitation Department. USR recom-
mended that the city discontinue landfilling as soon as
practical, and that MSW collection fees be increased to
cover the Department's costs. The report posed a choice
between landfilling and energy recovery, suggesting that
11
the latter was economically competitive, if not cheaper.
Local newspapers questioned the impartiality of the report,
noting that USR was also in the business of selling energy
recovery equipment. But city administrators received the
report favorably and implemented most of the reforms suggested,
including a higher MSW collection fee. The mayor and city
council, without a specific commitment, agreed to pursue
the energy recovery proposal further.
* The city planning department had already planned a modest
study of the sanitary division under the MAP program, then
in its third year.
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The proposal was much more appealing to both city
officials and residents after Koppers offered to provide the
city a site adjacent to its plant location (and the city's
industrial expansion area) for the recovery plant. City
officials recalled their siting difficulties in 1971, and
thought of the economic development the plant might spur.
The Koppers plant already caused severe odor problems, and
city residents doubted that a resource recovery plant could
make matters worse at that location. Many nearby residents
12
worked at Koppers and supported the proposal.
Negotiations between the city and Koppers continued
through the fall of 1975. Koppers' plant manager and a
company executive from the firm's Pittsburgh headquarters
focused on the need for reliable steam delivery. The city,
represented by Mayor Powell and the city's attorney, wanted
assurances that Koppers would either purchase all steam
produced by the plant or pay for unused steam (a "take or
pay" arrangement). Negotiations also centered on finding
an acceptable way to determine steam price. USR participated
in the negotiations, even offering legal services in drawing
up agreements, and worked with the state Department of
Pollution Control and Ecology (DPCE) to facilitate permit
13
applications. By late 1975, it was clear that all parties
would reach a satisfactory agreement.
In what marked the city's first formal commitment,
the city council in November 1975 voted to solicit bids
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for a proposal to design, build, and equip the modular
*
incinerator plant. Bids were received in January next year,
but only two were judged to meet the qualifications. USR's
bid included Consumat equipment and the Baldwin Construction
Company (a local firm), plus an offer of a full refund for
the two previously-purchased Consumat units. The other --
and lower -- bid was made by another local firm, Custom Sheet
14
Metal, using Sunbeam equipment.
Koppers informed the city council that it found the
Sunbeam proposal technically unacceptable. At this point,
the council could have rejected the low bid for not responding
to the bid qualifications; instead, it rejected both bids and
15
bypassed the competitive-bid, turnkey-procurement process.
In April, the council signed a memorandum of understanding
with USR for equipment purchase, deferring arrangements for
plant design and construction. The mayor and council, in
selecting USR, felt that the f irm had already put considerable
effort into the project, and had a commercially-proven product.
Negotiations between the city and Koppers continued. One
major area of disagreement remained; whether Koppers would
guarantee to purchase a specific amount of steam. Koppers,
being uncertain of its own future steam needs and future
* This is the so-called "turn-key" procurement approach;
the bid solicitation also listed qualifications which eligible
bidders had to meet -- previous experience with modular systems,
and so forth.
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energy prices, was reluctant to do so. The firm promised
that it would meet all of its steam requirements from the
city's plant, but refused to guarantee to purchase any
specific amount. The city declined to press the matter, and
decided to rely on the firm's goodwill. The city's bond
underwriter argued that the marketability of the necessary
revenue bonds would not be affected by lack of a specific
guarantee, and city officials wanted to hasten project im-
plementation.
In June 1976, the two parties signed a contract for site
leasing and for the long-term purchase of steam. Later that
year the city issued $1.3 million of revenue bonds to finance
capital costs. The project contractor began construction in
late 1976; initial testing of the plant took place in
September 1977, and the plant was fully operational three
months later.
Resource recovery system and results
The North Little Rock facility is a small-scale modular
combustion system with a capacity of 100 TPD. It is equipped
with four controlled-air modular combustion units, each with
a 25 TPD capacity. These units are paired with two boiler
heat exchangers, each capable of producing 10,000 pounds of
steam per hour at 150 pounds per square inch (psig). Each
combustion unit is equipped with an automatic ash removal
and wet ash conveyor system, but ash may be removed manually,
if necessary. The facility is designed to permit a doubling
in the number of combustion units and boiler heat exchangers
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if future expansion is desired. Consumat Systems, Inc.,
designed and manufactured the equipment.
Full plant operation requires a staff of nine. Incoming
refuse is dumped on the floor of the plant in front of each
pair of units,. where it is loaded. The combustion process
is a combination of pyrolysis, volatization, and gasification
of hydrocarbons; natural gas is used as an auxiliary fuel in
the second stage of combustion.
This process results in minimal odors and very low
16
stack emissions of particulates and other pollutants.
17
Incineration reduces MSW weight by about 70%. After
quenching, residual ash is hauled to a disposal site. The
city does not recover any materials from MSW -- either before
or after incineration. Because of its largely inorganic
nature, the ash need not be dumped at a sanitary landfill.
North Little Rock, for at least the first two years of
operation, dumped residual ash at a state-certified, privately-
owned site by the Arkansas River.
The plant is intended to supply steam to Koppers 24
hours per day, five days per week. The 1976 contract with
Koppers requires the city to deliver a minimum of 15,000
pounds per hour of steam, at 110-150 pounds per square inch
(psig), saturated. Koppers is not obligated to purchase a
minimum amount of steam, however.
The plant had capital costs of $1,530,000 (1978 dollars).
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The city received a refund for the two incinerator units
purchased earlier, and raised the remaining $1,350,.OO by
issuing 20-year revenue bonds, at interest rates ranging
18
from 5.75 to 6.75%.
Because the North Little Rock plant only hegan regular
operations in late 1977, and data are not yet available for
1979, operating results are only available for 1978. The
facility processed an estimated 15,125 tons of refuse in 1978,
19
or an average of 58 TPD. Most of this tonnage was residential
MSW delivered by the Sanitation Department. Private haulers
were charged a tipping fee of $0.90 per cubic yard (or about
$8.00 per ton), a price thought to be competitive with nearby
landfills. Initially, the daily throughput was only 40 TPD,
but this had risen to 80 TPD by October 1978, in response
to equipment modifications and operational changes that
increased hourly throughput of MSW at the plant.
The energy recovery facility has complied with state
standards for air quality thus far. Sulfur and nitrogen oxide
levels in stack emissions have been negligible, although
20
chloride emissions have been recorded. The inciner-
ator units are not subject to federal air quality standards,
being below the size threshold that would qualify them as new
sources.
Table 6 presents annual cost and revenue data for 1978.
Estimates of operating costs are based on several months exper-
ience in 1978, and include annual debt service of $44,000.
Project revenues are derived from two sources: steam sales
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and dump fees from commercial haulers who used the facility --
the latter are a relatively minor fraction. Revenues were
not as great as originally anticipated by USR, due to lower
than expected steam demand by Koppers. Under optimal operating
conditions, an independent research group predicted a net
processing cost of $2.73 per ton -- significantly below the
21
$10.53 result in 1978. The calculation assumed that the
facility runs at near-capacity and sells all steam produced.
TABLE 6 NORTH LITTLE ROCK PLANT COSTS AND REVENUES
2
Annual(1978) per-ton
1
Costs $365,000 $20.45
Revenues 17.7,000 9.92
Net costs $188,000 $10.53
Source: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Small Modular
Incinerator Systems with Heat Recovery: A Technical, Environ-
mental, and Economic Evaluation, by Systems Technology Corp.,
SW-177c, November 1979, pp. 1 1 7 -1 2 0 .
1. Includes operation and maintenance costs, and debt service
costs.
2. Assumes 17,850 tons per year (or 69 TPD).
Initially, USR proposed that it be allowed to manage and
operate the facility for the first two years. A successful
plant at North Little Rock was important to the firm's marketing
efforts, and USR doubted that the city had qualified staff to
22
operate their equipment. The city adjministration, however,
facing an employee surplus, declined USR's offer in order to
avoid layoffs. In retrospect, city officials and USR agreed
that city operation was unwise. Plant workers lacked the
necessary training, and management changed too often to
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develop any experience. As a result, equipment maintainence
was inadequate, and najor equipment breakdowns occured. In
late 1979, plant operation deteriorated seriously, and the
facility was forced to close. At Consumat's request the city
council agreed to let Consumat operate the plant. Consumat
23
spent $200,000 on repairs and reopened the plant in May 1980.
During the first year of plant operation, Koppers relied
entirely on steam from the recovery plant. But surge problems
-- peak demands for steam by Koppers that the plant could not
accommodate -- caused Koppers to re-activate one boiler, and
reduced steam purchases accordingly -- from 15,000 pounds per
hour to 10-12,000 pounds per hour.
Resource Recovery Choice 
-
North Little Rock was interested in resource recovery,
and specifically in USR's proposal, for several reasons.
While the city was not worried about the availability of
landfill facilities, disposal costs had increased recently,
and were expected to keep rising. USR pointed out the long-
term economic advantage of energy recovery in this respect.
The city, especially Mayor Powell, saw USR's proposal as a
way to improve the efficiency of the Sanitation Department,
by reducing hauling distances and improving collection vehicle
reli4ahility. North Little Rock also suffered from a depressed
*Includes new rolling equipment, replacement of refractory
walls, and extensive interior cleaning.
** Sanitation Department trucks often became mired or suffered
tire damage at the Jacksonville landfill, increasing vehicle
operation costs and reducing collection efficiency.
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local economy, and Mayor Powell saw the energy recovery plant
as a way to promote much-needed economic development. Given
pending natural gas shortages, the proposed facility would
make the city more attractive to new industry seeking a
location with dual energy sources. Finally, the city wanted
to recover its 1971 investment in modular incinerators.
The city's resource recovery choice was elective, and
was based mainly on long-term considerations. While the
Sanitation Department's collection program was perhaps in-
efficient, there was no pressing need to change collection
practices. Similarly, the city expected to continue hauling
MSW to the Jacksonville landfill for some time. Future MSW
collection and disposal costs, plus future economic development,
were the main factors motivating the city's choice.
For the reasons noted above, city officials were inter-
ested when USR presented its energy recovery proposal in 1974.
Full city support of and participation in the project awaited
the resolution of several issues, however. City officials
were unsure of how reliable the system would be. They doubted
that the plant would have a lower net disposal cost than land-
filling. Both city officials and residents worried about
siting, and the city needed some promises from Koppers demon-
strating its commitment to the project.
All but the last of these concerns were resolved by late
1975, however. Koppers assured the city that steam from the
proposed plant would meet its requirements. The city was
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reassured by a concurrent EPA study of small-scale modular
incinerators, which supported USR's claims about technical
feasibility and economics. Also, city councilmen were able
to visit three similar USR plants already under construction
24
or in operation elsewhere in Arkansas. USR predicted a low
initial per-ton tipping fee and rising steam revenues, in
contrast to increasing landfill and hauling costs.
As noted earlier, Koppers offered a site for the Dlant
which satisfied city officials and residents. By late 1975,
the city had successfully negotiated most aspects of an
agreement with Koppers, with the important exception of a
Koppers' guarantee to purchase minimum amounts of steam. The
mayor and city council were thus willing to commit themselves
to the proposal and solicited bids for plant development.
City officials faced little or no community opposition to
their decision. Earlier, local newspapers were concerned
about USR's apparent conflict of interest, but Koppers' site
offer and the prospect of a serious natural gas shortage
dulled these objections.
What is somewhat surprising about the city's choice
is that so few options were examined. City officials inves-
tigated only one alternative to the status quo in detail:
the modular incinerator technology, and USR's propos-al in
particular. Other options -- such as incineration without
heat recovery, MSW compaction .and hauling, and other energy
recovery technologies -- and alternative steam buyers or
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arrangements were apparently not investigated. North Little
Rock's size precluded large-scale energy recovery, and USR
was the main equipment vendor in Arkansas for modular incin-
erators. Nonetheless, it is not clear that the city had to
limit its options so severely.
Perhaps the most interesting feature of North Little
Rock's resource recovery choice is. the fairly passive role
taken by the city itself. The city was one of several par-
ticipants, rather than the instigator and lead party, in
considering resource recovery options. USR, and later Koppers
Company, initiated the idea of energy recovery. USR located
a potential steam buyer, made the initial proposal, conducted
various technical and economic studies, assisted the city and
Koppers in subsequent negotiations, and cleared the way for
necessary state permits. Koppers verified technical feasibility,
advocated strongly for USR's proposal, and offered the city
a site for the plant.
City involvement increased, however, during negotiAtions
with Koppers, and the mayor took a personal interest in the
25
project's success. The city's less prominent role can be
partly attributed to the fact that the energy recovery project
served two functions, being both an energy supplier and a MSW
disposal facility. As such, the plant had to meet the needs
of both users.
Several key individuals were largely responsible for the
project's consideration and eventual implementation.
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Mayor Powell used his political strength to gain the support
of the city council. -Powell felt it was important to improve
the efficiency of city services in general, and saw the USR
proposal as a way to do this, at least in the area of solid
waste management. Koppers' plant manager, Mr. Radcliffe,
took the lead in defining Koppers' steam requirements and
certifying that the USR proposal would meet those requirements.
His support for the modular incinerator proposal gave credi-
bility to the project. R. Michael Butner, president of USR,
had a key role in suggesting the proposal originally, con-
ducting the necessary studies, and persuading both the city
and Koppers of the proposal's merits.
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VII. CASE STUDY 4: AMES, IOWA
Since 1975, the city of Ames has operated a 200 ton
per day (TPD) refuse processing plant, one of the first such
facilities in the U.S. The plant receives MSW from Ames and
the rest of the county, and produces a refuse derived fuel
(RDF), which is fired as a supplementary fuel at the city's
electric utility plant. Despite persistent technical diffi-
culties and net operating costs of $13-16 per ton, over twice
those projected, the plant has met the county's disposal needs
since it began operation.
Ames' resource recovery decision was motivated in part
by an impending shortage of landfill capacity and strict new
state regulations affecting MSW disposal. But the city council
took a broad view of the disposal problem, and sought to
provide a long-term, environmentally sound solution to the
city's disposal needs. The city's choice was motivated by
non-economic criteria, both environmental and political,
although technical and economic feasibility were both issues
influencing the council's decision. Probably the most im-
portant factor leading to the .city's ch-oice was the fact
that the city owned its own utility, which made the RDF
technology attractive early in the planning process, focused
attention on this option, and guaranteed a market for a then-
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untested fuel product.
Background
Located in central Iowa about 32 miles north of Des
Moines, Ames developed as a farming center at the inter-
section of two railroad lines in western Story County. Ames
is now the principal city in Story County, with 63% of the
county's population. The 1970 population of Ames was 39,000 -
1
46% above the 1960 level. Growth during the 1970s was equally
brisk, but the future rate of increase is expected to be
slower.
Iowa State University (ISU) is located in Ames, and is
a major part of the community. About half of the town's
residents are students at-ISU, and many other residents have
some affiliation with the university. In addition to ISU,
several state and federal agencies are headquartered in -Ames,
and the city supports a range of manufacturing and agricul-
tural industries. Median incone in 1970 was $10,126, slightly
2
above the state and county average. Ames has a weak mayor
form of government, with a six member city council (the
mayor being the seventh -- and non-voting -- member). Con-
siderable responsibility for city administration rests with
the city manager and his staff.
Traditionally, municipal solid waste is collected
by private haulers throughout Story County. Some towns have
a franchise arrangement with one hauler; others merely license
haulers and allow open competition. Ames has no franchise
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requirement, and residents pay a monthly fee directly to
the hauler for refuse collection. In 1970, this fee was
3
$3.00 per month per household; it has since risen to $5.50.
In the early 1970s, most Iowa communities had one (and
in some cases two) open refuse dumps. Open burning was
widely practiced. Ames was using a former farm, acquired in
1956, to dump its MSW. A city operated facility, the dump
was then one of the better-run facilities in the state: MSW
received periodic earth cover. No accurate records of waste
tonnage were kept, but the city Public Works Department esti-
mated that disposal costs were about $2.00 per capita per
year (or $2.50 per ton). Disposal costs were almost non-
existent in other towns where open dumping and burning were
4
practiced.
Chronology
A 1970 act of the state legislature provided the impetus
for a local review of MSW disposal practices. The act pro-
hibited open dumping and burning and required communities
5
to have approved disposal plans by late 1972. The act
created a Solid Waste Disposal Commission within the state
Department of Health to implement the legislation, and re-
quired communities to obtain disposal permits by July 1975.
The Commission in 1971 promulgated rules and regulations --
for both landfill operation and new landfill siting -- plus
* Author's estimate, assuming 0.8 TPY per capita.
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local plan guidelines. Its early enforcement activities
virtually ended open burning, which in turn aggravated
disposal problems for many communities.
In 1970, in response to the new legislation, Ames'
City Manager J. R. Castner conducted a study of the city's
landfill, discovering that the site sould reach capacity
6
in only 3-5 years and a new landfill would be needed.
Castner realized that Ames' situation was not unique and
initiated discussion with Story County officials and repre-
sentatives of 14 other towns in the county, proposing a
county-wide landfill. Because of its broader jurisdiction,
county participation was considered crucial. The proposal
died after county officials declined to pursue the matter
7
(on the advice of the County Engineer).
At the same time, Castner's staff was investigating
possible sites for a new city (or county) landfill. The
results of their 1971 survey were pessimistic. New state
standards for landfill siting ruled out marginal lands because
of infiltration and leachate problems. The only alternative
was prime agricultural land, which was considered too costly
at $3,000 per acre. The new site would have to be outside
the city, and Castner and others anticipated serious opposition
8
from nearby landowners and residents.
As a consequence, the city council in late 1971 created
a task force to consider other options that might obviate
the need for acquiring a new landfill site. The task force
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was an informal group, consisting of two city council
members -- Joe Maxwell and Dean Huston, Public Works Director
Arnold Chantland, and three professors from the ISU depart-
ments of civil engineering and mechanical engineering. The
group investigated a variety of options, including more
efficient methods of landfilling as well as energy recovery
alternatives. Task force members visited several facilities
in the U.S., including a MSW shredding and landfilling
operation in Madison, Wisconsin, a materials recovery plant
in Franklin, Ohio, and a refuse derived fuel plant in St.
Louis, Missouri. The group was impressed with the St. Louis
facility -- a joint EPA-city demonstration project that used
the burnable portion of the city's MSW to generate electricity.
A preliminary check showed that the city's own coal-burning
utility could be adapted to burn a mixture of RDF and coal.
In late 1972, the task force concluded its research and
recommended to the city council that they authorize a more
9
detailed study of the promising RDF idea. Other city council
members agreed that the proposal merited further study; they
too expected great difficulties in siting a new landfill
and were anxious to find an alternative. In October, the
council hired the firm of Gibbs, Hill, Durham, and Richardson
(GHDR) of Omaha, Nebraska, to study the technical and economic
feasibility of a RDF plant. Primarily an architectural and
engineering firm, GHDR had designed recent additions to the
city's electric utility.
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In February 1973, GHDR submitted its report to the city
council, concluding that the RDF proposal was indeed feasible
-- the city generated a sufficient amount of MSW, a waste
processing plant would work, and the resulting RDF product
10
could be successfully burned at the city's utility plant.
The report suggested that disposal costs could be reduced
if the facility received waste from the entire county (about
55,000 TPY), due to economics of scale. Councilman Huston
and others were apprehensive about the proposal; they realized
that the then-unproven technology represented a financial
risk. Nonetheless, the council was unanimous in its accept-
ance of GHDR's report and support of the RDF concept. Council-
woman Koerber and others considered landfilling environmentally
objectionable and favored,. in principle, an approach that
recovered energy and materials from MSW. The council resolved
to pursue the proposal further.
Meanwhile, the state's disposal regulation program was
gathering momentum. In early 1973 regulatory functions were
transferred from the Health Department to the newly-created
Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ). DEQ pursued a
policy of consolidation -- closing small dumps and encouraging
area-wide landfills. DEQ closed the Story City dump in 1973,
forcing Story City to use Ames' landfill and dramatizing the
11
need for a county-wide facility. Comiunities in Story
County had few options; upgrading each small dump would be
prohibitively expensive and the county was not interested in
a common landfill. City Manager Castner thus found town
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officials entuhsiastic when he met with them to discuss
their participation in the city's RDF project. Castner
assured them that the facility would be less costly than a
12
regional landfill.
Ames' city council was already convinced of the feasi-
bility and desirability of the project. With informal com-
mitments from these communities, the council in May 1973,
hired GHDR to design the refuse-processing plant. Council-
woman Koerber opposed GHDR's selection, feeling that the firm
lacked the necessary ability, but Castner assured the council
that no other firms were available and interested in the
project.
In April 1974, GHDR's designs were completed and Ames
signed 25-year contracts with six towns -- Maxwell, Rowland,
13
Gilbert, Kelley, Story City, and Cambridge. The contracts
required each town to have its MSW delivered to the Ames RDF
plant and provided for a per-capita sharing of net operating
costs.' Ames promised to receive MSW even if the plant failed
completely, but made no promises about net operating cost,
predicted at the time to be about $5 per capita per year.
Also in April, the city council unanimously approved
the issuance of general obligation (G.O.) bonds to finance
most construction costs. Due to an unfavorable bond market,
the bonds did nQt sell. Ames successfully petitioned the
state legislature to raise the maximum interest rate payable
on municipal bonds -- from 5% to 6%. In February 1975, the
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council again approved the issuance of G.O. bonds in the
amount of $5.3 million. These were sold successfully. Con-
struction began, using city funds, and the contractor com-
pleted RDF plant construction and utility-boiler modification
in August 1975. The Public Works Department started shake-
down operations at the plant and it was fully operational by
late 1975.
Resource recovery system and results
Ames' refuse processing plant is designed to produce a
fuel supplement (RDF) and to recover various processed
materials -- ferrous metals, aluminum, paper products, and
woodchips. The plant has a 200 TPD capacity, serves all of
Story County, and operates five days per week (hence 52,000
TPY capacity). It is modeled after an earlier RDF plant in
St. Louis, of a similar scale, and operated jointly by EPA
and the city. The Ames plant supplies RDF to the Ames
Municipal Power Plant, a city-run utility which burns a
mixture of 20% RDF and 80% coal.
Refuse entering the plant goes through a sequence of
processing subsystems: a primary shredder (breaks refuse
into six-inch chunks), a ferrous recovery unit with electro-
magnets, a secondary shredder (reduces refuse to two-inch
chunks), an air classifier (separates light and heavy, non-
combustible items), and an aluminum recovery unit. The
system also includes a wood chipper and paper baler.
Packer trucks and private vehicles dump refuse on the
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tipping floor, and pay a nominal tipping fee of $1.00 and
$.50 per load, respectively. Bulky and hazardous items are
set aside at this point. After processing, the RDF is sent
by pneumatic tubes to a storage bin, and from the bin to the
utility boilers; the bin allows the utility to use RDF on a
continuous basis. The non-combustible (or "heavy") fraction
is hauled to the Ames landfill. Because of its inorganic
nature, this waste does not need to be covered daily, and
disposal is a simple matter.
At the utility plant, all three boilers have been mod-
ified to burn RDF as a fuel supplement. Two boilers are
stoker-fired (coal and RDF are burned on a continuously
moving grate); the third is suspension-fired (coal and RDF
are shot into the boiler and burn in suspension). Suspension-
firing of RDF did not work well, and the city later added a
special grate in this boiler. The utility uses all of the
RDF that the processing plant can produce, and pays a per-
ton price equivalent to its fuel-offset value -- that is,
the value of the conventional fuel it displaced. This price
varies as a function of the heat content of the RDF and the
cost of coal and natural gas used by the utility; it averaged
14
$10 per ton in 1976.
Ames contracted with Vulcan Materials Co. of Indiana,
which buys recoyered ferrous metals for a fixed percentage
of the market price of highgrade steel scrap. In 1976, the
price averaged $20 per ton. Ames also contracted with Alcoa
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Aluminum to purchase shredded aluminum at a price of $300 -
15
400 per ton, depending on the quality of the material. The
city has no contracts for paper or woodchips.
Total capital costs for the refuse processing plant were
$6,310,000 (1975 dollars), including $4.12 million for the
plant itself and $1.6 million for the RDF storage bin and
16
utility modifications. Other capital cost items included
land, rolling equipment, architectural and engineering costs,
and start-up costs. The project was financed by $5.3 million
of G.O. issued by the city in 1975; the bonds have a 20-year
duration at an interest rate of 5.3% per year. The remaining
$1 million came from city funds reserved for solid waste
disposal activities.
Ames' plant has provided a steady supply of RDF to the
city utility (meeting 10% of the utility's fuel-energy needs),
and has reduced MSW tonnage requiring disposal by over 90%.
At the same time, the plant has faced serious technical and
financial difficulties. The city and GHDR expected some
technical problems, given the lack of experience with RDF
production and firing at that time. Much of the equipment
was designed for different uses and had to be adapted to
meet plant needs. Still, it was hoped that most problems
would be resolved after a brief shake-down period.
But many problems persisted. Equipment failures (espec-
ially in the air classifier and RDF conveyor units) caused
17
considerable down-time -- over 20% in the last half of 1976.
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"Bridging", or the piling up of RDF material upon itself,
frequently caused pneumatic lines to become clogged, requir-
ing the whole system to be shut down until the line was
cleared. Plant design did not include dust control, and the
city was forced to take remedial steps, installing a disc-
screen separator after the primary shredder in order to isolate
dust and grit. The aluminum recovery unit was plagued with
problems -- including broken magnets and inefficient cooling
systems -- and has not produced a saleable product since
18
start-up.
Despite technical difficulties, the plant has turned
away very little MSW tonnage. Table 7 shows MSW tonnage
received during the plant's first three years of operation.
TABLE 7 WASTE TONNAGE PROCESSED BY AMES RDF PLANT
Tons per year(TPY) Tons per day(TPD) Percent
of capacity
1976 40,900 157 79%
1977 48,300 186 93%
1978 37,700 145 73%
Source: Resource Recovery: The Ames Experience, Financial
Summary (Update)
1. Assumes 260 operating days per year.
2. Plant has 200 TPD capacity.
Of the incoming MSW tonnage, 84% becomes RDF, 7% is recovered
as ferrous metals, and 9% is rejected and hauled to the land-
fill. Recovered paper, aluminum, and woodchips are a negli-
gible fraction of the total. The plant recovered about 3,000
TPY of ferrous metals over the three-year period, at a price
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of $30-35 per ton. Because of very poor market prices for
paper during this period, the plant recovered only about 120
TPY of paper.
The city utility encountered no major problems using RDF
as a fuel supplement. An average of 36,000 TPY of RDF was
burned during the 1976-78 period, supplying about 10% of the
utility's fuel needs -- in terms of BTU. RDF has a high ash
content but a low sulfur content. When burned with high
sulfur coal, it decreases sulfur (di)oxide emissions, allowing
the city to use a greater percentage of cheaper, high-sulfur
local coal (rather than Wyoming or Eastern coal). But RDF
firing also increases particulate emissions significantly;
when the state DEQ re-tested stack emissions in 1978, the
19
plant exceeded particulate standards (with and without RDF).
Even after modification, the utility does not consistently
meet these standards; the state DEQ and Ames are still trying
to resolve this issue.
Net operating costs have been more than twice those
estimated by GHDR in the 1972 feasibility study ($5.68 per ton),
as Table 8 shows.
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TABLE 8 AMES RDF PLANT COSTS AND REVENUES
Revenue 1976 1977 1978
RDF revenue 319,500 353,300 322,300
Ferrous metals revenue1  97,900 102,300 89,300
Other material revenue 4,400 10,200 3,200
Tipping fees 2  32,200 49,600 61,400
Other 3  10,500 7,400 84,600
Total $464,500 $522,800 $560,800
Costs
O&M 626,700 690,900 689,500
Debt service 482,800 465,400 463,600
Equipment reserve 12,500 12,500 12,500
Total $1,122,000 1,168,800 1,165,600
Net cost 657,300 646,000 604,900
$16.06/ton 13.38/ton 16.04/ton
Source: Resource Recovery: The Ames Experience, Financial
Summary (Update)
1. Woodchips and paper, mainly.
2. At RDF plant and sanitary landfill.
3. 1978 figure included $75,000 EPA grant for equipment
modification.
There are several reasons for these unexpectedly high costs.
GHDR, in its 1972 study, overestimated MSW generation rates
in Story County, predicting 55,000 TPY. In fact, yearly
tonnage has been much less; the plant has operated well
below capacity, and major fixed costs have been allocated
among fewer tons of refuse. Second, the RDF plant received
low per-ton revenues for RDF. GHDR estimates of fuel-offset
prices assumed that RDF would be fired with 100% coal, but
an unexpected availability of cheaper natural gas lowered
the utility's per-BTU fuel cost. The plant received essen-
tially no revenue from recovered aluminum or paper (due to
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equipment failure and low market prices, respectively).
Third, rapid inflation in 1974 and 1975 almost doubled GHDR's
1972 estimate of capital costs. This plus a higher interest
rate on G.O. bonds increased debt service dramatically.
Because of the plant's cost-sharing plan, Ames and -the
other participating communities in Story County have had to
finance these extra costs, usually from city tax revenues.
Unaccustomed to sizeable disposal fees, the participating
towns were quite distressed by the high per-ton costs. Two
communities -- Huxley and Gilbert -- tried unsuccessfully to
break their respective 25-year contracts with Ames in early
1977. Both Ames and the other towns sought state and federal
grants in 1977, arguing that the RDF plant was of national
importance and a valuable demonstration project. Later that
year, Ames received a multi-year $600,000 demonstration grant
from EPA.
Resource Recovery Choice
Several characteristics of Ames' resource recovery choice
are noteworthy. The city's choice, unlike those in other cases,
was not elective. The city council knew that within five years,
Ames would need a new disposal site (or technology).
The council's decision. to develop and RDF plant was a
conscious and positive act; the cQuncil regarded the city's
These communities were concerned over predicted $5 per capita
per year costs, never mind $10-12 costs. By way of comparison
nearby counties pay $4-8 per ton for landfilling (or $3-6 per
capita per year). 2
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MSW disposal situation as an opportunity. Faced with an
essentially short-term disposal problem, (i.e. how to expand
landfill capacity), the council took a longer view and sought
a solution that would be beneficial to the city in the long-
term.
The city council made no single, identifiable decision.
Rather, council members were initially attracted to one
option, and subsequent studies served only to reinforce that
attraction. There are several reasons for this early narrow-
ing of options. The most obvious alternative -- landfilling
-- was considered undesirable on environmental, economic,
and political grounds. City manager Castner and the council
thought the new state landfill standards would make landfill
siting both expensive and politically difficult. Des Moines
was in the process of siting a new landfill and faced lawsuits
from landowners and resolutions opposing siting from nearby
communities. Other resource recovery options were very
limited in the early 1970s; the 1971 task force had very few
examples to evaluate or observe. The successful operation of
the St. Louis RDF plant and the availability of a willing RDF
user in Ames (the utility) made this technology very attractive
to the city council.
* Qther local and state officials discount landfill siting
difficulties, howeyer, citing an abundance of open space and0 23little history of citizen opposition.
** Public works director Chantland predicted $6 per ton disposal
costs.
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The nature of Ames and the time at which the decision
was made influenced the criteria used by the city council
to evaluate the RDF proposal. Ames is a college town: many
residents have ties to ISU. Residents are receptive to unique
and innovative solutions, and often support creative or exper-
22
imental approaches to municipal problems. This attitude is
reflected in the city council. In this sense, the Ames case
is atypical; it is unlikely that other Iowa communities would
have supported an essentially untested technology.
Ames' decision came at the height of the environmental
movement, at a time when Americans were becoming acutely
aware of natural resource and pollution problems. This
philosophy or attitude was very much a factor in the city's
choice -- both among city council members and in the com-
munity at large. The RDF proposal was seen as a way of
preserving agricultural land, avoiding the environmental
impacts of another landfill, and conserving natural resources.
Certainly other criteria entered into the council's
decision as well. The city council thought that resource
recovery would engender less public opposition than a new
landfill. They were convinced that the RDF plant would
work and that it would be cheaper in the long run. The
1972 GHDR report predicted a 10-year "payback" period; after
this point, landfilling would be more costly in present-
24
value terms. The city also had lots of willing technical
assistance -- from GIIDR and the university. GHDR was
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anxious to become established in what it saw as a future
growth industry, and. many faculty at ISU were willing to
assist in developing such a major new technology.
The council's choice engendered very little controversy
-- among council members or the public. Despite early skep-
ticism by some council members over the new technology,
25
"nobody dragged their feet", and the council was unanimous
in supporting the RDF proposal. This consensus can be ex-
plained by both the prevailing politics, which supported
innovative and environmentally-sound solutions, and the
merits of the proposed RDF project.
The public at large had a minimal role in the resource
recovery choice. No community organizations were involved
in either suggesting or promoting resource recovery. Because
solid waste disposal was considered an "essential public
service", the council did not need to obtain voter approval
26
on the G.O. bonds which financed the plant. More importantly,
the RDF -proposal was compatible with community sentiment at
that time. Although the city newspaper was critical of the
project, questioning its feasibility, most citizens apparently
27
favored or were unaware of the project. In retrospect, some
residents wish city officials had spent more time on citizen
education prior to their decision. Now, many Ames' citizens
are unhappy with the RDF plant's high operating costs.
Earlier efforts to involve the public might have produced
a broader consensus, and could have sensitized citizens to
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the possibility of higher-than-predicted costs.
Project financing and siting, two common pitfalls in
energy recovery plant development, caused no serious problems
in Ames. The city had ample debt capacity at the time, and
had set aside funds since 1970 to finance a new disposal
facility. Land for the project was available near the power
plant, in a primarily commercial area. Some of the few
residents near the site did object to the project on grounds
of excessive noise, but the city was able to purchase the
necessary parcels without resorting to condemnation.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper set out to accomplish two tasks: to observe
how communities view the low-versus-high technology resource
recovery issue, and to suggest a process municipalities
should use to choose between the two approaches (and among
specific resource recovery options). The first matter is
empirical; the second prescriptive. This section addresses
both in terms of the fours case studies.
The Community Perspective
In none of the four -cases did communities directly
compare high and low technology approaches to resource re-
covery. Rather, one approach was compared to the community's
present waste disposal method. In the case of El Cerrito
and Marblehead, recycling was evaluated in the context of
continued landfilling or incineration. North Little Rock
and Ames saw energy recovery as an alternative to landfilling.
These cases are probably not unique; the author knows of
no communities that have viewed low and high technology
approaches as competing options.
* In at least two metropolitan regions 
-- Portland, Oregon,
and Washington, D.C, -- high-technology proposals have been
rejected in favor of further study of both low and high-
technology options. In neither case, however, were the
two approaches seen as comparable substitutes.
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Why is this the case? As section III pointed out, low
and high-technology approaches have different attributes and
solve different problems. They also tend to address different
community objectives and criteria for solid waste management.
From the case studies, it appears that communities considering
low-technology approaches have been primarily concerned
with environmental issues (conserving natural resources and
energy, and reducing landfilling impacts) and to a lesser
extent with economic issues (reducing disposal costs and
extending the useful life of the community's landfill).
Communities considering high-technology approaches have been
primarily concerned with economic and fiscal issues (pro-
viding new disposal capacity, reducing disposal costs, and
attracting new industry) -and to a lesser extent with environ-
mental issues (conserving materials and energy, as in the
Ames case).
Aside from these differences, though, communities tend
to view the choice between the two approaches differently
than those engaged in the appropriate technology debate.
As section III noted, the debate has focused on national
issues of resource policy. In considering resource recovery
options, many municipalities are more concerned with net
costs, system reliability, and compliance with environmental
regulations than they are with resource policy. While the
national debate focuses on two generic approaches to resource
recovery, communities must consider specific options -- at
specific sites, each with associated costs, risks, and
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benefits. The municipality's time frame is usually shorter,
with priority on meeting short-term disposal needs. Finally,
local governments can view solid naste management as an
"open" system. A local option, such as hauling MSW to a
regional landfill (as Marblehead decided to do in 1975),
might not be considered a valid long-term disposal solution
from a regional or national perspective.
Municipalities are usually motivated to consider re-
source recovery for a specific reason (or reasons). These
reasons may imply a lot about the opticns available to the
community and how they are valued, as we will see. Common
motivations include: little remaining disposal capacity,
high disposal costs, stringent state (or other) regulations
affecting MSW ,disposal, public support for resource recovery,
and demand for alternative energy.
Disposal capacity may be limited by a landfill near
its capacity, as was the case in Ames, or by an incinerator
(or dump) that is scheduled to be closed at some future
time, as in the case of Marblehead in 1975. If new disposal
facilities can be easily acquired, the municipality may
feel no need to consider resource recovery. More often,
however, developing a new disposal facility means signifi-
cant initial costs, and political opposition to facility
siting. Communfities in this situation have strong incentives
to consider resource recovery.
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High disposal costs -- or costs that are expected to
increase rapidly in the future -- also make resource recovery
an attractive option, in art economic sense. Disposal costs
refer to all post- collection costs, including any transfer
or long-distance hauling costs. Expected future costs are
often more important than present costs. A community such
as Marblehead, facing a high marginal (as well as average)
cost of disposal, may find that even small reductions in MSW
tonnage can yield lower disposal costs overall.
Stringent state (and other) regulations may reduce
remaining capacity at a disposal facility (for example,
by restricting a landfill area or requiring an incinerator
to close if it cannot meet air quality standards, as. in
Marblehead). They may also increase disposal costs, by
requiring remedial work (such as leachate barriers in
existing landfills) or restricting new landfill sites (and
increasing haul distances or acquisition costs). In Ames,
state regulations hastened the need for a new landfill,
which was expected to increase disposal costs from $2.50
to $6.00 per ton.
Public support for resource recovery -- in the form of
citizen proposals, support for resource and/or energy
conservation, or opposition to existing disposal practices --
is often a primary reason for municipal involvement. In
El Cerrito, Marblehead, and (to a lesser extent), Ames
citizen support was a major factor in those cities decisions
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to study and eventually proceed with resource recovery.
Public support is critical for low-technology approaches,
given their greater reliance on resident participation.
Either the municipality itself or local industry may
be interested in alternative sources of energy, and a high-
technology system for energy recovery may be attractive in
this context. Alternative sources may be needed to counter
expected shortages or supply curtailments (as in North Little
Rock) or to obtain less expensive energy. If local industry
is the energy user, a community may be presented with a
specific resource recovery proposal prior to any municipal
study.
Communities may have one or several reasons for wishing
to consider resource recovery. Those found in the four case
studies are summarized in Table 9.
Suggestions for a Community Choice Process
At the community level, the appropriate technology
issue is more complex than its national counterpart. In
order to facilitate further discussion, let us first restate
the original question, which posed a simple choice between
the two approaches, to read: "Does resource recovery make
sense for a given community? If so, which type or combination
is most appropriate?" Trying to construct a useful choice
process is difficult, however, since many important aspects
of the resource recovery choice are specific to a community
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TABLE 9 MOTIVATION FOR CONSIDERING RESQURCE RECOVERY
Reason Low Technology High Technology
Marblehead El North Ames
Cerrito Little
1972 1975 1975 Rock
(a) (b)
1. Need new o o
disposal
capacity
2. Face high o o o
or increa-
sing dis-
posal costs
3. Stringent o o
state (or
other) reg-
ulations
4. Local sup- o o o 0
port for
resource
recovery
5. Demand for 0
alternative
energy
* Three columns refer to Marblehead's three different
choices: (i) a voluntary decision in 1972 to start
separate collection, (ii) consideration of energy
recovery just prior to having its incinerator closed
in 1975, and (iii) a late 1975 decision to upgrade
its separate collection program after arranging for
regional landfilling.
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or resource recovery proposal. Particular options can be
combined in various ways (e.g. the separate collection -
centralized MSW processing combination noted in section III).
The case studies and their results are not immediately
relevant, since they do not illustrate a choice between
low and high-technology options. Nonetheless, the cases do
contain certain lessons which are applicable to the resource
recovery choice. In each case, a community was motivated
to consider resource recovery, examined specific options,
and selected its preferred choice. The remainder of this
section offers specific suggestions concerning the local
choice issue. Without defining a choice "process", these
suggestions can help a community to (i) determine the feas-
ibility of low and high-technology approaches to resource
recovery and (ii) see if that community's solid waste manage-
ment circumstances and objectives favor one approach over
another.
Feasibility of Resource Recovery
Clearly, a municipality must have an interest in
resource recovery before examining the feasibility of
different technologies. Assuming that this is the case,
for one or more of the reasons noted above, the matter of
feasibility must be addressed. At this stage, we are
concerned with the feasibility of the two approaches, not
specific resource recovery options or projects. Below
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are listed two sets. of criteria for evaluating the feas-
ibility of low and high-technology approaches; each is
discussed in turn.
The feasibility of the low-technology approach to
resource recovery depends, on:
(l) MSW Composition
A community considering recycling should analyze its
MSW composition to be sure that recyclable materials are
present in sufficient quantities to justify materials
recovery. On a nation-wide basis, recyclable materials
2
constitute the majority of MSW by weight, but this compo-
sition varies considerably on a regional and seasonal
basis. In Marblehead and Somerville, Massachusetts, MSW
contains a greater-than-average amount of paper and glass,
3
and less ferrous metals. In El Cerrito, a high percentage
of aluminum helps make recycling quite profitable.
(2) Availability of materials markets
Ready access to secondary material markets is a pre-
requisite for any recycling program. Communities should
investigate materials markets carefully, locating potential
buyers and checking product prices and specifications. Some
regions of the country have significantly better secondary
materials markets than others -- notably California and
4
the mid-Atlantic states. This is due to several factors.
Scrap paper, a principal source of recycling revenues, is
often sold for export, so that port regions support a large
share of this market. Other materials buyers tend to locate
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near their markets in major metropolitan areas.. Als.o
important is the strength and diversity of those markets.
A recycling program, such as El Cerrito's, that can sell
its products to several buyers will tend to receive higher,
more consistent material revenues than a single-buyer
program. In Marblehead, a market for mixed recyclables was
critical to the feasibility of that community's minimum-
separation recycling program.
(3) Community support and participation
Recycling depends on household separation of recyclable
materials and, in some cases, their transportation to drop-
off or buy-back center. As such, the willingness of
citizens to conduct source separation of household wastes
is fundamental to recycling success. A community can
create incentives for recycling -- such as lower refuse
collection costs or free use of the town's landfill, but
even so, a successful recycling program relies heavily
on citizen cooperation and interest. In both Marblehead
and El Cerrito, a clear majority of residents expressed
interest in source separation, and in fact participate in
the local recycling program. Predicting participation is
difficult. There appears to be only a minor correlation
between the rate of community participation in recycling
and socio-economic factors, such as age, income, and
5
education. Communities should conduct surveys to determine
residents' willingness to participate in source separation,
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and under what terms.
These are the factors most relevant to low-technology
approaches. The feasibility of high-technology resource
recovery depends on a somewhat different set of factors:
(1) MSW Energy Value
While the relative abundance of recoverable materials
is again of interest, the energy value of MSW is the most
important factor for high-technology resource recovery.
Energy value, measured in BTU per pound of MSW, depends
on the mix of organic and inorganic wastes; EPA estimates
*
the national average to be 5,000 BTU/lb. Like MSW composition,
energy value can vary greatly from community to community
and between seasons in agiven community. A predictable
range of MSW energy value is necessary to a successful
energy recovery plant; if this value is too low or too
unpredictable, energy recovery may be impractical. In Ames,
the consulting engineers estimated energy value at 3,000-6,000
6
BTU/lb., indicating wide fluctuations. In Marblehead and
Somerville, EPA found an average energy value of 4,340 BTU/lb.,
7
but this varied between 4,000 and 5,300 BTU/lb. In neither
Ames nor North Little Rock was energy value an obstacle to
energy recovery.
* For com arison, coal has an average energy value of 12,600
BTU/lb D.
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(2) Availability of energy markets
The high-technology approach focuses mainly on energy
recovery. Many centralized plants also recover materials,
but energy recovery is usually the main feature of the plant
and provides the bulk of plant revenues. In Ames, ferrous
metal recovery represents only 22% of MSW-derived revenues;
at North Little Rock's modular plant, no materials are
recovered. Once again, the presence of.such markets is
crucial to the success of an energy recovery plant. There
is often a wide range of markets for recovered energy,
depending in part on the energy product. Electric utilities
are an important potential market for electricity, and under
the right circumstances steam or RDF. In the Ames case,
the fact that the city operated its own utility created a
ready market for RDF, a hitherto unproven fuel supplement.
Local industry or the city itself may provide a market for
steam -- for industrial processes or heating purposes.
Typically, an energy recovery plant must provide a product
that meets the needs of the energy buyer. The North Little
Rock plant, while providing a sufficient daily supply of
steam, could not meet the peak steam demands of its energy
buyer. A community should investigate potential energy
markets, identifying potential buyers and checking product
specifications and needs.
(3) Sufficient MSW tonnage
Until recently, it was generally agreed that large
quantities of MSW -- on the order of 1,500 tons per day --
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were required for economically feasible energy recovery.
But modular incinerators (with heat recovery), such as the
North Little Rock plant, make the high-technology approach
possible for communities producing more than 30 TPD -- the
equivalent of a population of about 15,000. Smaller towns
would probably have to participate in a regional project.
The minimum size of an energy recovery plant depends largely
on the particular technology chosen: waterwall incinerators
and RDF plants are considerably larger, usually in the 600 -
2,000 TPD range. Ames' proposed RDF plant required more
MSW tonnage than the municipality produced, leading it to
contract with other towns to deliver their wastes to the
facility.
(.4) Air quality regulations
MSW is by definition a highly variable and heterogenous
fuel; its combustion at an energy recovery plant yields a
more unpredictable mix of air pollutants than that from
fossil fuel combustion. In particular, MSW combustion
produces high levels of particulate emissions, as well as
lesser amounts of hazardous materials, such as lead and
9
cadmium. The feasibility of energy recovery may depend
on the stringency of state (and federal) air quality regu-
lations and their enforcement. Ames' coal-fired utility
plant has had considerable difficulty meeting federal air
quality standards since it started using RDF as a fuel
supplement, and was obliged to install remedial emissions-
control equipment. Smaller, modular-incinerator facilities
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may pose less of a problem; their starved-air incineration
process reduces emissions considerably, and they are some-
times too small to be subject to "new source" regulations
(as was the case in North Little Rock).
(5) Institutional factors
Under this heading, the community should consider the
legal and organizational factors which affect its ability
to plan, procure, finance, and (if relevant) operate an
energy recovery system. EPA's series of reports on resource
recovery plant implementation provides guidance in this
respect:
Questions to be raised here include: what are the
laws affecting the process by which the city can
procure a recovery' system; can the city efficiently
operate a recovery plant and market the product it-
self; can the city assure that wastes will be de-
livered to the plant; what financing options are
available to the city; and what arrangements must
be made tolbeet the requirements of the financial
community.
Institutional factors were important in both energy recovery
cases. In Ames, contracts with other towns were necessary
to assure sufficient MSW tonnage, and the city had to persuade
the state legislature to raise the allowable interest rate
on municipal bonds before it could obtain financing. In the
North Little Rock case, a key state utility commission ruling
which assured the modular incinerator of auxiliary fuel
contributed to the project's feasibility. The city also had
to reform its MSE collection financing system in order to
meet state requirements for issuing special revenue bonds.
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Some of these factors are predictable and should be anti-
cipated; others arise unexpectedly.
(6) Access to capital
Energy recovery plants are capital intensive, especially
large-scale ones. Amortized capital costs for proposed plants
range between $10 and 30 per ton (1980 dollars). The Ames,
Iowa, plant serves a population of 65,000 and cost $5.5 million
(1975 dollars), or $14,000 per ton of capacity. North
Little Rock's modular incinerator cost $1.3 million (1976
dollars), or $13,000 per ton of capacity. For many types of
plant procurement, a community must have (and be willing to
devote) sufficient resources to finance plant development.
Private equity has not been attracted to energy recovery
projects, due to the newness of the technology and to
their perceived risk. Revenue bonds backed by the project
being financed may not attract buyers for the same reason.
As was the case in North Little Rock, states may authorize
the city to issue special revenue bonds, or otherwise
improve the city's access to capital.
Factors Affecting the Choice
Any of the items noted above may pose a serious ob-
stacle to a low or high-technology approach. Given that
both approaches are basically feasible, a community's
* Author's estimate, based on EPA and American Iron and
Steel Institute published data.1 1
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preference for one or the other will depend on its cir-
cumstances and on Jts solid waste management objectives.
The following factors, it should be stressed, refer primarily
to the choice between approaches, and less to specific
resource recovery options.
Several circumstances affect the low-versus-high
technology choice. They include the community's motives
for considering resource recovery and various external
conditions, such as state policy for resource recovery.
Each may cause a community to prefer one approach over the
other.
(1) Remaining disposal capacity
Remaining capacity refers both to the remaining life-
time of a community's existing disposal facility and the
prospects for replacing that facility in the future. A
community with little remaining capacity at its present
facility will be forced to make a choice between energy
recovery and traditional disposal methods; a low-technology
approach alone will not solve its problems. Ames and Marble-
head (in 1975) faced this situation; in both cases, the
municipalities decided that siting a new landfill was either
too costly or politically unworkable, and considered energy
recovery options. It may be desirable to select an interim
solution in order to provide adequate time to examine resource
recovery options; this is what Marblehead did in its 1975
contract with a private hauler. While energy recovery is
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a better response to limited disposal capacity, recycling
may be a useful part of the community's resource recovery
strategy.
Conversely, a community with considerable disposal
capacity can utilize low-technology strategies to extend
the life of its landfill and reduce annual disposal costs.
For example, a recycling program that diverted 20% of MSW
would extend the community's landfill capacity by 25%; about
3 years if 12 years of capacity remained. In neither Marble-
head nor El Cerrito, however, did the low-technology approach
have this effect; Marblehead's landfill was virtually full
when it began recycling, and El Cerrito is only one of
many users of a private landfill in Richmond.
(2) MSW disposal costs
In general, high disposal costs favor the use of both
high and low-technology approaches. High tipping fees or
anticipated increases motivated Ames, North Little Rock,
and Marblehead to consider resource recovery strategies.
There may be no incentive for recycling, however, unless
the marginal cost of disposal is also high. In Marblehead,
a $19 per ton marginal cost was quite sufficient to encourage
recycling efforts. Unfortunately, there is no convenient
definition of "high" cost; net disposal cost is only one
factor in the resource recovery decision.
(3) State regulations affecting MSW disposal
State regulations and their enforcement tend to result
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in increased disposal costs and reduced disposal capacity,
with consequences as described in (1) and (2) above.
(4) Citizen attitudes toward resource recovery
Active community support for low or high-technology
approaches may be an important motivation for local officials
to investigate one or both approaches. This is particularly
true for low-technology approaches, which depend heavily on
resident participation, as the El Cerrito and Marblehead
cases illustrate.
(5) Demand for alternative energy
A demand for alternative energy -- by the municipality
itself or a local industry -- clearly favors energy recovery
options. In North Little Rock, the energy recovery proposal
by U.S. Recycle and Koppers Co. dominated the city's consid-
eration of resource recovery. Nonetheless, some combination
of low and high-technologies may be appropriate, to reduce
the non-combustible fraction of incoming MSW.
(6) Other resource recovery projects
A community may already be host to a privately-operated
recycling program (as in Marblehead and El Cerrito), or it
may have access to high-technology recovery systems in the
region -- either planned or already in operation. The ex-
istence of a low or high-technology project will, for several
reasons, make that approach more attractive to a community.
An existing recycling program enhances the prospects for low-
technology strategies, serving the function of a pilot
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project by checking material markets and resident partici-
pation, and identifying operational problems. The early
recycling program in El Cerrito was valuable in this respect.
Similarly, a nearby energy recovery plant may represent
another option to the community: participation in an existing
or planned resource recovery project. Marblehead, for example,
considered contracting with an existing energy recovery plant
(RESCO, in Saugus) or joining one of the planned regional
resource recovery projects. This option had the advantage
of minimizing the community's planning and implementation
costs and avoiding the financing issue. In regions, such
as northeast Massachusetts, several private and/or regional
energy recovery proposals compete for MSW from essentially
the same area. Such a situation is favorable to munici-
palities in the region, who can select the project that
best suits them, and perhaps bargain for more favorable
terms. Participation in a regional project has disadvantages
too, usually forcing a community to meet various obligations,
such as contributing a minimum annual volume of MSW.
(7) Role of state and federal policy
While external to a community's specific circumstances,
state and federal policy on resource recovery can nonetheless
create important incentives and disincentives for both low
and high-technology approaches. By providing technical
assistance and planning grants for resource recovery projects,
government agencies can to a degree define resource recovery
options and determine their relative feasibility. EPA's
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demonstration grant program has assisted both low and high-
technology systems; its 1975 grant to Marblehead improved
implementation prospects significantly. California's SWMB
grant program enabled El Cerrito to purchase most of the
equipment necessary to the expansion and later success of
its recycling program. The E.C.ology program brochure
emphasizes this point:
Without CETA grants and State Solid Waste Grants,
the chances for most (California) communities to
start and retain a recycling program are minimal.
Other state policies and actions have incentive effects
too. In Arkansas, a state utility commission ruling assured
modular incinerator plants of a continuous supply of aux-
iliary fuel. State legislation authorizing special revenue
bond financing of solid waste disposal facilities enabled
North Little Rock to finance its energy recovery plant for
a relatively low rate of interest. In Massachusetts, a
state policy promoting centralized resource recovery led
to the formation of several regional resource recovery pro-
posals, which Marblehead was able to choose from. State
policies in Iowa, on the other hand, served to impede re-
source recovery. State law set an upper bound on interest
rates for municipal bonds; the limit had to be raised before
Ames could successfully finance its RDF plant. Iowa's DEQ
in fact recommended against the Ames proposal, citing its
* Although the town chose instead to build a transfer station
and utilize a regional landfill.
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high cost and risk.
Just as a community's circumstances can affect its choice
between resource recovery options, so can the community's
objectives with respect to solid waste management. Clearly,
each community will have a somewhat different set of objectives,
and hence different criteria for evaluating resource recovery
options. Nonetheless, we can identify several commonly used
criteria, and assume that a given community will weight
each criterion appropriately (and may add others). Five
criteria for evaluating resource recovery options are most
relevant: net cost, reliability, environmental impact,
opportunity cost, and time constraints.
(1) Net cost
The net cost of a resource recovery option refers to
the net per-ton cost to the community of MSW processing and
disposal. An estimate of net cost should account for future
trends, perhaps expressing cost in terms of net present value.
It may be necessary to incorporate changes in collection cost;
Marblehead's separate collection program reduced refuse
collection costs to the community. A measure of net cost
should also account for risk and uncertainty, indicating
the measure's accuracy and events which could significantly
affect cost estimates.
* Several criteria are derived from a recent study of solid
waste disposal options in Rockport, Massachusetts. 1 3
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The net cost of energy recovery, generally speaking,
is more volatile than that of a low-technology approach
coupled with, say, landfilling. Energy recovery plant costs
are the result of large revenues and gross costs; small
changes in either can have large effects on net cost. In
both North Little Rock and Ames, net costs of disposal have
been twice (or more) those predicted at the time when the
community's choice was made. However, in some circumstances,
landfill costs may be equally or more volatile, depending
on the availability of new sites or the enforcement of state
regulations. Marblehead may find its disposal costs rising
rapidly in the future if the Amesbury landfill is closed or
modified by state regulations, as could well happen. If
energy prices and landfill costs increase rapidly, as they
seen likely to do, the net cost of energy recovery will
decline faster than the net cost of a low-technology strategy.
(2) Reliability
Reliability refers to the dependability of a resource
recovery system -- its design, equipment manufacturer, and
operator (as relevant). Especially in energy recovery plants,
a community is concerned about system flexibility, redundancy,
and back-up procedures. In general, the recycling-landfill
approach is far more reliable, due to its relative simplicity
and lack of inter-dependent or sequential elements. For ex-
ample, a paper-baler breakdown at El Cerrito's recycling
center would only cause a slight decline in project revenues,
since unbaled paper brings a lower per-ton price. At the
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Anes plant, however, clogged pneumatic tubes transporting
the RDF product cause the entire plant to shut down until
the tubes are cleared. Careful design can assure that a
centralized recovery plant is reasonably reliable, but this
also means higher cost. In practice, siting a new landfill
or incinerator (a more frequent occurence with a low-technology
approach) may also pose a "reliability" problem.
(3) Environmental impact
A resource recovery option should comply with state (and
federal) regulations concerning air quality, water quality,
and landfilling. It should also be consistent with any local
or community policies promoting materials recovery, energy
conservation, and so forth.
Both low and high-technology approaches have unavoidable
impacts which can be largely mitigated, although often at
substantial cost. Recycling implies continued impacts from
traditional disposal. For-both approaches, the seriousness
of the unavoidable impacts is somewhat uncertain; for example,
the health effects of MSW emissions are largely unknown.
(4) Opportunity cost
A community is usually concerned with both the opportun-
ity cost and the degree of local control implied by a resource
recovery option. How many future actions are foreclosed by
the option? The preemptive effect may affect a broad or
narrow range of future choices, and may be of short or long
duration. Both North Little Rock and Ames issued debt that
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will be repaid over a 20 year period. Clearly, a flexible
resource recovery system has a lower opportunity cost.
The high-technology approach usually has much higher
opportunity costs. Plant financing requires debt service
payments over 20-30 years, and usually necessitates contracts
of equal duration with MSW contributors and/or energy buyers.
Energy recovery plants are usually inflexible, in that they
cannot easily adapt to changes in MSW volume or composition.
Participation in a regional energy recovery project usually
means relinquishing considerable local control over solid
waste management decisions (such as whether to conduct source
separation, where to dispose of MSW, and how much disposal
will cost). Low technology approaches, while less binding on
a community, can have a de facto opportunity cost if the
community must make a long-term commitment for a new disposal
facility.
Communities wishing to minimize opportunity costs should
consider various combinations of MSW disposal and recovery
options. For example, in 1975 Marblehead chose to develop
a transfer station and haul its MSW to a regional landfill.
This meant a 5-year contract with a private hauler, a much
shorter commitment than would have been required had the town
participated in a regional resource recovery project or develop-
ed its own disposal facility. It can be argued that any com-
bination of low-technology resource recovery and conventional
disposal which defers a high-technology approach is worth
considering. By deferring energy recovery, a community can
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reap the benefits of technological advances and greater
operating experience in the energy recovery field, which
will presumably reduce net costs and improve system relia-
bility.
(5) Time constraints
Communities often face time constraints in developing
new solid waste disposal capacity; a resource recovery option
should be implementable within the necessary time frame.
Options with uncertain implementation schedules that depend
on events beyond the community's control pose a problem in
this respect. High-technology approaches take considerable
time to be implemented, and the lead time can vary considerably
- between 3 and 9 years. In Ames, the intervial between
serious consideration of the RDF proposal and project start-
up was nearly four years; in North Little Rock, this interval
was slightly more than three years. Not surprisingly,. smaller
plants appear to take less time to procure and develop. The
practicality of energy recovery options may depend on interim
disposal options to tide a community over.
Choice Process Suggestions
The previous material is relevant mainly to a community's
general evaluation of low and high-technology approaches. In
order to proceed further, a community must define specific
resource recovery options (such as municipally-run separate
collection or small-scale modular incineration with heat
recovery), specifying potential energy or materials buyers,
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sites, service area, and so forth. The community's evaluation
and choice will invariably hinge on implementation factors,
many of which defy generalization; examples of these can be
found throughout the four case studies. Consequently, rather
than describing a formal choice process, the remaining mater-
ial reviews the case studies and identifies various lessons
which apply to the resource recovery decision.
A point often overlooked in evaluating alternatives to
the status quo is that present conditions tend to change;
the "status quo" is not static. In comparing resource
recovery options -- with each other and with present disposal
practices, a community should look for future trends in land-
filling costs, state regulations, energy prices, and so
forth. Future trends are most relevant to resource recovery
options that require long-term commitments. Ames' decision
to develop an energy recovery plant was based largely on
city officials' expectation of much higher landfill costs
in the future. A net present value analysis may be helpful
in this respect.
Information is an important commodity in the resource
recovery choice process. Good planning information is crucial
to an informed decision, especially for high-technology
projects which are more sensitive to systems effects. In
the Ames case, project consultants over-estimated MSW gen-
eration in the RDF plant's service area; as a result, per-
ton operating costs were considerably higher (and total
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revenues were less) than predicted, An early analysis of MSW
composition and potential community participation was impor-
tant in El Cerrito's decision to develop its own separate
collection program. While information gathering should be
geared to actual data needs, a community should develop
necessary information early in the choice process.
In a similar sense, a thoughtful municipal choice
process demands ongoing staff attention -- to keep local
officials informed and to be sure that the evaluation process
reflects community (versus private or plant investor) interests.
Ames' special task force, composed of city staff and officials,
served this function; so too did the El Cerrito solid waste
advisory committee.
There is a tendency in defining and evaluating resource
recovery options for a community to seize the first project
that comes along. The necessary preoccupation with implemen-
tation issues. reinforces this tendency, with the result
that other, possibly better, options are never explored.
This happens in terms of defining resource recovery tech-
nologies, available sites, material and/or energy buyers,
equipment vendors, and so forth. In North Little Rock, for
example, the city compared only one proposal -- the USR-
Koppers modular incinerator proposal -- to the landfilling
option. Communities should, if at all possible, define
their options more broadly and not foreclose choices too soon.
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Similarly, communities should be sure that analyses
of resource recovery options are impartial, and sensitive
to local needs and objectives. In North Little Rock and, to
a lesser extent, Ames, feasibility studies of the preferred
option were performed by private firms with a direct interest
in seeing the option implemented. The usual paradox is
present: often, only firms with experience in the design
and operation of resource recovery projects are competent
to evaluate the proposed option(s). This problem is less
apparent for low-technology systems, whose assessment does
not demand sophisticated technical skills.
A community should promote public participation in the
resource recovery choice process. This is important for
both low and high-technology approaches, but for different
reasons. Source separation and recycling require extensive
household involvement, and early public input is the first
step in publicizing and promoting a low-technology approach.
High-technology systems are, of course, capital intensive
(and/or require long-term commitments), and resource com-
mitments of this size often require public approval of some
sort. Formal voter approval was not necessary in either Ames
or North Little Rock, but in both cases there was little or
no community opposition.
Finally, communities should bear in mind that any
resource recovery strategy must be integrated with the
existing solid waste management system already in place. In
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El Cerrito, the cooperation of the city's franchised col-
lector was considered relevant to the development of its
separate collection program. North Little Rock found it
necessary to reform city collection practices to provide
its energy recovery plant with a dependable supply of MSW.
In evaluating resource recovery options, municipalities should
examine their compatibility with other MSW management acti-
vities -- M4SW storage, collection, and disposal.
In the years ahead, resource recovery will assume
increasing importance as the costs of traditional solid
waste disposal methods increase and as their various impacts
become more apparent. Federal and state government can
develop policies which create various incentives and dis-
incentives, and thus hasten the trend, but decisions to
implement resource recovery will be made at the local level
-- either by initiating projects or by participation in
regional or private projects. Municipalities will be faced
with specific resource recovery options, not generic approaches.
The local decision, while responsive to state and federal
policy, should be based on local conditions and criteria.
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GLOSSARY AND ACRONYMS
BTU: British thermal unit, a measure of energy
Centralized MS14W processing: centralized separation and
recovery for use or recycling of materials and/or energy
contained in mixed MSW.
DEQ: Iowa Department of Environmental Quality.
DPCE: Arkansas Department of Pollution Control and Ecology,
Energy recovery: A resource recovery process in which part
or all of MSW is recovered as a fuel, or burned to produce
steam for heating or electricity.
EPA: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
GHDR: Gibbs, Hill, Durham, and Richardson, Inc., of Omaha,
Nebraska.
High-technology: In the context of resource recovery, any
centralized facility processing mixed MSW to recover energy
and/or materials.
ISU: Iowa State University.
Low-technology: In the context of resource recovery, a process
for materials recovery which relies on the source separation
of MSW.
Materials recovery: The recovery of various materials from
MSW -- using either a high or low-technology approach.
MSW: Municipal solid waste -- regularly collected solid
waste from households, institutions, and commercial establish-
ments.
.Recycling: Reprocessing of used products into new basic
materials, in which the identity and utility of the original
product is lost. Usually refers to low-technology systems.
Resource recovery: Processes for recovering useful energy
and/or recyclable materials from mixed or separated MSW;
includes both high and low-technology approaches.
RPA: Resources Planning Associates, Boston, Massachusetts.
SCA: Service Corporation of America.
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Separate collection: Regular collection of waste products
that are segregated according to material type.
Source spearation: Household separation of recyclab.le
materials from other MSW prior to recycling.
SWMB: California State Solid Waste Management Board.
TPD: Tons per day (similarly, TPM is tons per month and TPY
is tons per year).
USR: U.S. Recycle, a franchised vendor of Consumat equipment.
